

MARSABIT COUNTY

Capacity Gaps and Needs Assessment
for Food Security Safety Nets and Emergency
Preparedness and Response

November 2015



**World Food
Programme**


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


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The World Food Programme Kenya has received generous support from the Government of Sweden to work with the Government of Kenya and county governments to strengthen their capacities in social protection, emergency preparedness and response, and resilience building for the period January 2015 to December 2017. The partnership is entitled “Enhancing Complementarity and Strengthening Capacity for Sustainable Resilience Building in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands”.

ABBREVIATIONS

CCC	Core capacity characteristics
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plan
CSG	County Steering Group
HGI	Hunger governance indicator
HSC	Humanitarian supply chain
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
NGO	Non-governmental organization
WFP	World Food Programme

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INTRODUCTION

For many decades, in close partnership with the Government of Kenya, the World Food Programme (WFP) has provided food assistance to fight hunger in Kenya. Under the new Constitution of 2010, important areas of governance have been devolved to counties, including aspects of agriculture, health, transport, pollution control, trade and, not least, disaster management. In this respect, counties are expected to assume the role of first responders in emergencies. As Kenya has reached middle-income status, the Government is interested in building its own robust national social protection and emergency response systems. In this spirit, WFP is adjusting its role from being a provider and implementer of social protection programmes to becoming an adviser and supporting the Government in its efforts to build the institutional, legal and programme frameworks for these systems.

WFP Kenya has received generous support from the Government of Sweden to work with the Government of Kenya and county governments to strengthen their capacities in the areas of social protection, disaster risk management and resilience building for the period January 2015–December 2017. The partnership is entitled “Enhancing Complementarity and Strengthening Capacity for Sustainable Resilience Building in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands”, and focuses on i) supporting strategic coordination of social protection at national level; ii) capacity development for newly devolved (county) structures; and iii) transitioning support for cash-for-asset beneficiaries to national and county governments.


Marsabit is one of the counties that has expressed interest in cooperating with WFP to support the county’s capacity to prepare for and respond to food insecurity in normal times and during emergencies.

Before an adequate capacity support programme can be elaborated, a holistic understanding of existing capacities and gaps is needed. This understanding will help focus resources on strategic needs and areas where the support can have the maximum impact. This capacity gaps and needs assessment is the first step in a process of collaboration between WFP and the county government. It serves to assess existing capacities, and agree where capacity development investments can be made in line with the county’s priorities.

This report summarizes the results of the capacity gaps and needs assessment for Marsabit County. It will form the basis of a specific capacity support programme, which will be formalized through a cooperation agreement between WFP and the county government and will be implemented over the following two years. The capacity gaps and needs assessment will also form the baseline against which the results of the following two years of capacity support will be measured.

1

METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT



The capacity gaps and needs assessment primarily serves to inform the development of specific capacity support strategies and programmes between the county and WFP.

The capacity gaps and needs assessment is a highly participatory process, where the county government takes the lead role, with WFP acting as a facilitator. The process took place over a week in October 2015, and included group and bilateral discussions as well as a large validation meeting. In this process, county government-led technical teams as well as key informants discussed two themes: safety nets and emergency preparedness and response (including early warning food security assessments, and humanitarian supply chain management).

For both areas, WFP had prepared detailed question guides that probe into the current

level of capacity in the county with respect to five areas of hunger governance:¹

- policy and legislative environment
- effective and accountable institutions
- financing and strategic planning
- programme design and management
- continuity and sustained national capacity/civil society voice

The county teams and informants worked through the prepared question guides with facilitation by WFP, addressing the relevant questions, providing a wide

¹ **Hunger governance** is defined as the obligation of nations to their citizens to guarantee freedom from hunger, under-nutrition and harms caused by disasters by formulating conducive legislation and policies, strengthening effective institutions, supporting strategic national development plans, and investing in sustainable hunger solution measures and clearly established parameters for handing over such measures to nationally managed systems.



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range of relevant county-level documents, identifying scores for the present level of capacity in each sub-area, and tentatively discussing priority areas for capacity support.

The report starts with a general description of Marsabit County. It then summarizes the capacity assessment for each area of hunger governance, and subsequently proposes a number of specific capacity support interventions.

A final section explains in more detail the method of identifying and calculating

the county capacity indicator baseline, and presents the results of the Marsabit capacity gaps and needs assessment in this respect, with specific capacity scores and a short description of future factors that would justify a higher score.

The matrices with the detailed question guides, team discussions – supplemented by information from a desk review of national and county-level policy and legal documents and relevant data – and scores are given in annexes 1, 2 and 3 of this report.



2 DESCRIPTION OF MARSABIT²

The county of Marsabit, part of Kenya's arid lands, covers an area of about 71,000 km² in the extreme north of the country, bordering Ethiopia to the north, Lake Turkana to the west, Samburu County to the south and Wajir and Isiolo counties to the east.

Most of the county comprises an extensive plain lying between 300 m and 900 m above sea level. There are no permanent rivers in the county, but four drainage systems exist, the largest of which is the Chalbi Desert, which covers almost 1,000 km². Most of the county is covered by rocky, stony and rugged lava plains with poor soil development.

Most of the county is arid. Rainfall ranges between 200 mm and 1,000 mm per annum, and its duration, amount and reliability increases with altitude. About 75 percent of the total land area lies below 700 m above sea level and forms low-potential rangeland. Rainfall is low and unreliable, rates of evaporation are high, and the soils are shallow and poor. There is higher agricultural potential in the foothills, lower mountain slopes and highlands, which receive moderate rainfall of about 700 mm annually. In the foothills, livestock and crop production are the major economic activities. The highland areas of Mt. Marsabit, Mt. Kulal and Ol Donyo Mara Range receive moderate rainfall and have productive agricultural soils.

The county is divided into four administrative sub-counties: Marsabit




Figure 1 Map of Marsabit: sub-counties and population density

Central, Laisamis, North Horr, and Moyale. According to projections of the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics based on the 2009 National Population and Housing Census, Marsabit had a population of about 350,000 in 2015.

Two thirds of the population are younger than 25 years. The population grows at an annual rate of 2.73 percent, which continuously increases pressure on natural and social resources as well as the demand for livelihood opportunities.

2 This section draws information from: the *Marsabit County First Integrated Development Plan, 2013–2017* (Marsabit County Government); the *2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census* (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010), the *2015 Long Rains Season Assessment Report* (Kenya Food Security Steering Group, August 2015), and *Food Security and Outcome Monitoring* (WFP, September 2015).

Population density is 23 and 2–3 persons per km² in Marsabit Central and North Horr/Laisamis, respectively. There are two towns, Moyale (with 43,000 inhabitants) and Marsabit town, the county capital, with 16,000 inhabitants.

Livestock keeping is the main economic activity in the county. The main livestock include cattle, goats, camels, donkeys, and poultry. Only 2 percent of the county population practices crop farming. At present, only 0.3 percent (5,060 ha) of the total estimated arable area (1,582,750 ha) is under food and cash crop production, with maize, sorghum, millet, beans, fruits and vegetables being the main crops.

Figure 1 shows the livelihood zones across the county. Pastoralists account for 80 percent of the population, agropastoralists, 16 percent, with the remainder of the population being employed in other livelihoods, including formal employment and fishing in Lake Turkana.

Most of the land is owned communally except for a few demarcated and privately owned sections (with a mean holding size of 0.8 ha) in Saku constituency (Marsabit Central). Less than one percent of land is registered, predominantly in urban areas and in the mountains with a higher level of agricultural activity. There is one indigenous and gazetted forest (Mt. Marsabit, 152.8 km²) and two non-gazetted forests, Mt. Kulal and Hurri Hills with a total area of 750 km², where there is potential for agroforestry.

Hazards

There are no permanent rivers in the county and 60 percent of the households rely on boreholes, springs and wells. Most parts of the county experience acute water shortages. The mean distance to the nearest water point is 25 km.

Marsabit is an arid and chronically food-deficient county. Recurrent droughts occur every one to three years. They are a major challenge for the development of the county, resulting in significant losses for the population and resources being required for emergency relief rather than longer-term development. Drought reduces the availability of and access to water, leading to loss of livestock, shortage of food and loss of biodiversity. In recent years, lack of water has resulted in loss of approximately 20 percent of livestock in the county. Limited pasture has led to overgrazing and forest encroachment, further exacerbating environmental degradation.

In general, the long rainy season occurs in the months of March to May, and the short rains occur mainly between October and December. However, rainfall patterns in the county show considerable temporal and spatial variations and are become increasingly erratic.

Other hazards threatening the county and its population include wildfire, livestock diseases, pests and insecurity, the latter including cattle rustling and conflicts over access to pasture and water. Highway banditry affects the free movement of people and goods.

Food Security and Hunger

The 2015 Long Rains Assessment categorized the acute food insecurity phase for all livelihood zones in the county as stressed (IPC³ phase 2).⁴ The performance of the 2015 March to May rainfall season was better than the two previous seasons, where the performance was poor. The number of people that are currently facing acute food insecurity

³ Integrated (food security) phase classification.

⁴ Households are able to meet minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies

is approximately 74,800, compared to February 2015 when 100,100 people were found to be food insecure. In 2013, the number of people who were food insecure was 65,600 and in 2014 the number increased to about 86,000 people. This gradual increase in the number of people that are acutely food insecure indicates a deterioration of household food security during that period.

According to the September 2015 Food Security and Outcome Monitoring data, 11 percent of households showed

poor food consumption, compared to 14 percent in September 2014; while those with borderline food consumption increased from 28 percent in 2014 to 42 percent. Households with acceptable food consumption decreased from 58 percent to 47 percent. Households are increasingly employing consumption coping strategies. The Coping Strategies Index rose significantly to 19 in September 2015, compared to 4 during the same period in 2014, signifying a deterioration in food security.

3**CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT**

During the capacity gaps and needs assessment process, different teams comprising technical staff and county officials discussed and assessed capacity gaps and needs for safety nets and for emergency preparedness and response, and identified separate capacity scores for both areas and for each of five hunger governance indicators. This made it possible to discuss the most relevant questions with the right key county officials in an efficient way. In addition, discussing questions – even though closely related – separately provided a certain triangulation of responses, which were compared and validated at the final plenary session.

All details concerning the specific questions discussed and the sub-scores identified for separate areas of hunger governance can be found in the complete matrices in annexes 1, 2 and 3.

Hunger Governance Indicator 1: Policy and Legislative Environment

Kenya's Constitution of 2010 enshrines a number of fundamental rights and freedoms in its Bill of Rights. With respect to safety nets, these include the right to life (Art. 26), the right to human dignity (Art. 28) as well as economic and social rights (Art. 43). In particular, Art. 43 foresees that every person has the right (c) to be free from hunger, and to have adequate food of acceptable quality; and (e) to social security. Not least, Art. 43 (3) prescribes that the state shall provide appropriate social security to persons who are unable to support themselves and their dependants. The fourth schedule of the constitution

(allocation of specific tasks to the national government and county governments) does not specify which level of government is responsible for social protection. Both national and county governments are responsible for disaster management.

The overarching Draft National Disaster Management Policy⁵ looks at disaster risk management as encompassing the full continuum, from preparedness, through relief and rehabilitation to mitigation and prevention. It also emphasizes preparedness on the part of the government, communities and other stakeholders in disaster risk reduction activities. The policy aims to increase and sustain resilience of vulnerable communities to hazards through diversification of their livelihoods and coping mechanisms. This entails a shift from short-term relief responses to development. The policy also points out that providing sufficient and timely early warning information on potential hazards that may result in disasters will go a long way to preserving life and minimizing suffering. Not least, the policy also sets out guiding principles concerning the key features for an effective disaster risk management system.

These include that:

- the Government is to continue to play the lead role in the strategic planning and management of disaster risk reduction, as well as the responsive management of the full disaster cycle;
- a disaster management policy should be developed and aligned to the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005–2015, which stresses the paradigm shift to disaster risk reduction, including the

⁵ Ministry of Devolution and Planning. 2015. *Draft Devolution Policy*. Nairobi. Government of Kenya.

early warning system, preparedness, prevention and mitigation;

- a complementary responsive approach for a conventional responsive disaster cycle management, (including an early warning system, response, relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery) should be developed to ensure appropriate remedial action where preventive proactive measures have failed;
- an operational early warning and disaster management information system should be developed that triggers rapid and timely response and provides regular monitoring and evaluation of base data for disaster risk analysis, profiling and trend analysis.

The notion is that counties will act as first responders to emergencies, while the national government sets standards (e.g. assessment and targeting methodologies and beneficiary registration) and steps in with additional resources when an emergency affects a share of the population above a certain threshold. However, this threshold has not yet been defined.

The County Government Act of 2012 stipulates that a county government shall plan for the county and no public funds shall be appropriated outside a planning framework developed by the county executive committee and approved by the county assembly. This act along with the Public Financial Management Act, 2012, therefore calls for preparation of a county integrated development plan, which must be harmonized with the national development plan.

The Marsabit County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) 2013–2017 aligns its programmes with Kenya Vision 2030 and its five-year priorities for local level implementation. It also provides a linkage between the implementation of county and

national government flagship programmes and the Millennium Development Goals.

The scope of the spatial planning contained in the CIDP is to cascade global and national development policies to the county and sub-county levels.

The CIDP provides a thorough analysis of the prevailing socioeconomic development in Marsabit County. Main development challenges include lack of water, drought, low agricultural production and productivity, environmental degradation, poor road infrastructure, inadequate markets for local products, and high illiteracy rates. Drought leads to the worsening of water scarcity, loss of livestock, shortage of food and loss of biodiversity.

Due to persistent drought, livestock and human diseases are frequent and development resources are diverted to take care of emergencies. Important cross-cutting issues include poverty (92 percent of the population are considered poor), gender inequality, insecurity, people living unsupported with disabilities, exposure to disasters (in particular drought and floods), and HIV/AIDS. Primary school enrolment rate stands at 49 per percent, which is far below the national level of 99 percent. There are 166 primary schools, 30 secondary schools and 285 early childhood development centres in the county.

The CIDP outlines programmes in the following priority areas to promote development in the county:

- agriculture and rural development
- energy, infrastructure and information and communication technology
- general economic, commercial and labour affairs
- health
- education

- public administration and international relations
- social protection culture and recreation
- governance justice, law and order
- environmental protection, water and housing

Under social protection, the CIDP outlines in chapter 7.7, cash transfers (KES 2,000 per month) to 5,000 older persons and to 700 persons with severe disabilities (both as ongoing projects and new project proposals). The CIDP links with all the county sectoral plans through its geographic information and planning frameworks.

The CIDP acknowledges the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other development partners in contributing to policy formulation and resource mobilization and in supporting community empowerment and advocacy. Not least, the CIDP provides, in its institutional framework, for a county coordination committee, which brings together chief officers, directors of non-devolved departments and representatives of non-state actors.

The Marsabit County Contingency Plan of 2013⁶ was prepared by the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) with close participation of the county. It mainly focuses on droughts, and foresees different interventions in the areas of i) food security and livelihoods support, ii) water, iii) human health and sanitation, iv) education and v) conflict management, according to the five stages of early warning, i.e. normal, alert, alarm, emergency and recovery. Activities foreseen by the contingency plan include:

- providing supplementary feed for livestock;

- scaling up cash transfers to the most vulnerable households;
- providing school feeding and additional support aimed at retaining girls in school during droughts;
- implementing other safety net programmes (not specified);
- maintaining essential dietary components for the most vulnerable groups, e.g. a programme to maintain milk access for young children in poor households;
- managing acute malnutrition through supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes and the promotion of optimal infant- and child-care practices to ensure that food has maximum impact;
- extending feeding programmes, including providing food over the school holidays, and providing additional porridge to schools under the regular school feeding programme;
- enhancing health and nutrition surveillance and treatment;
- facilitating programmes using a variety of mechanisms (cash for assets, cash vouchers or transfers) and supplement/scale up where appropriate;
- providing targeted water trucking if necessary
- de-silting water pans (through food or cash for work) to restore their holding capacities;
- distributing emergency seeds (including short-cycle varieties) or tools;
- subsidizing vulnerable farmers, e.g. in land preparation;
- repairing irrigation infrastructure and supporting irrigation where appropriate.

⁶ NDMA, 2013. *Marsabit County Contingency Plan, Kenya*.

Aligned to the different stages of the NDMA emergency cycle for agriculture and food security, the contingency plan foresees an unconditional cash transfer of KES 3,500 to 4,000 vulnerable households in the 'alert' stage, 4,500 vulnerable households in the alarm stage and 12,000 vulnerable households in the 'emergency' stage (in particular households headed by the elderly, orphans and vulnerable children, and the chronically ill). Food or cash for assets (of the same value) will be provided to 6,000 households in the 'recovery' phase for community initiatives and the rehabilitation of irrigation schemes.

Under the area of livestock, the contingency plan plans to link households targeted by the Hunger Safety Net Programme and other safety net programmes to markets.

Finally, in its section on standard operating procedures, the contingency plan assigns specific roles throughout the drought cycle to key actors, including NDMA, those involved in the Kenya Food Security Meeting, the Kenya Food Security Steering Group, the county planning units, the County Steering Group (CSG), community disaster risk reduction structures, and thematic teams on drought information management, public relations and communications, food item coordination, conflict management, rapid assessment, human health, nutrition, water, hygiene and sanitation, crop and livestock drought response, and livestock.

A county nutrition action plan is in place, having been adapted from the national nutrition action plan. A number of the county level instruments appear to have been developed through participatory and consultative processes involving civil society actors, United Nations agencies and the private sector. However, it was noted that community participation was low due to the low literacy levels (22.9 percent according to Kenya Demographic and Health Survey

2014 – one of the lowest in Kenya) and the remoteness and inaccessibility of some parts of the county.

At present, the following safety nets exist:

At national level:

- three programmes under the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services, i.e. the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children programme, reaching about 3,200 households, the Older Persons Cash Transfer, reaching about 3,400 households, and the Persons with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer, reaching about 350 households;
- school meals, covering about 10,500 pre-school-aged children in early childhood development centres and 45,500 children in primary schools, supported by WFP;
- health and supplementary feeding for about 4,000 children under five and about 3,000 pregnant and lactating women, supported by WFP;
- a labour-intensive asset-creation programme with about 24,500 beneficiaries in Moyale in the northeast of the county, supported by WFP.

At county level:

- the Hunger Safety Net Programme, funded by bilateral donors and national government, covering 16,286 beneficiary households;
- county-funded cash transfers to the elderly and disabled, complementing the respective Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services national programmes; however, it is not clear how the county – without access to the national single registry or a database on vulnerable households that would help it identify the households most in need – can know

if it actually increases the coverage of cash-transfers to elderly and disabled, or if it provides a double benefit;

- the Marsabit County Contingency Plan foresees considerable funds for the distribution of relief food or cash for the different stages of the drought cycle;
- a programme providing seeds to farmers; however, the demand far exceeds the available resources, and internal bureaucracies and a lengthy procurement process hinder the timely provision of seeds and services;
- subsidized tractor-ploughing services; this has been extremely costly, compelling the county to look for qualified partners to help them model a management scheme that ensures the programme is technically and financially viable;
- bursaries for middle-level technical training from the Education Department;
- for drought emergencies, the Marsabit County Contingency Plan foresees large relief transfers of food or cash to the affected populations.

The early warning system in Kenya has been operational for over a decade now, through which, information has largely been made available by the government with support from other partners. While information has been available, the county has experienced a lack of a more sustainable early warning system in terms of financing and information dissemination. Several government policies and documents have entrenched this into various documents in order to ensure sustainability. An example of such recent efforts are the Kenya Vision 2030 Sector Plan for Drought Risk Management and Ending Drought Emergencies (2013-2017), which focuses on drought as one of the

most significant climatic hazards affecting Kenya. The government commits itself to ending drought emergencies by the year 2022. Kenya's Vision 2030 recognizes ending drought emergencies as a key pillar for attaining the envisaged GDP growth target. Early warning systems, and monitoring of interlinkages with responses have been entrenched in the strategy document.

The document recognizes the recent improvements in early warning and contingency planning systems and drought management in Kenya, though early planning has occasionally been lacking, leading to late response to early warning signals. This has also led to over-reliance on relief food during emergencies, despite prior contingency planning.

As part of its long-term strategies, the government has established NDMA with a statutory mandate to coordinate and harmonize multi-stakeholder responses to drought and coordinate assessments and early warning.

The institutional framework for arid and semi-arid land development was approved and various components were established. However, national efforts do not yet reflect the devolution of government through the Kenya Constitution of 2010 (both national and county governments have responsibility for disaster management) and how responsibility for disaster management (including early warning and food security assessment) will be distributed between national and county governments. This question has to be clarified as soon as possible so all levels know what is expected of them and what other parties will contribute.

The CIDP makes allusions to early warning systems but without a clear plan of how these would be designed or incorporated into the operations. Capacity development is therefore required to enable each of

the respective institutions to execute their mandate effectively.

A county-level disaster management bill is yet to be introduced for debate at the county assembly. This is a huge gap in the legal environment within which emergency response should operate. In an ideal situation, such an act would explicitly provide a legal basis for emergency preparedness and response activities by clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of various actors as well as establishing an institutional set-up for emergency preparedness and response. Without enactment of a disaster management bill, emergency response in the county risks being incoherent, ad hoc and less effective.

The Marsabit County Emergency Fund Act 2014 is in place, with a copy made available to the technical focus group discussion for consideration. The act establishes the fund, capping it at 2 percent of the county revenue. In the financial year 2015/16, the budgetary allocation to this fund stood at KES 40 million, which is deemed insufficient for emergency response. There is no explicit allocation or earmarking of funds for preparedness action, assessments, or mitigation.

While a number of promising developments are under way, a number of weaknesses were observed:

- The emergency fund act is not clear on how evidence will be obtained to trigger exactly which use, and this could pose a challenge for transparency.
- There is an overconcentration of programmes in some geographical areas and some beneficiaries receive benefits under multiple safety net programmes. There is a need for better coordination - and to enable

such coordination, for clear access to information on who receives what and from which programme.

- There is limited guidance on programme scalability and the determination of the level of cash transfer values.
- The efficient management of safety nets is hampered by uncoordinated interventions insufficient, budgets, and inadequate skills for safety net implementation. As a county-level disaster management act is lacking, there is no clarity of roles and responsibilities of relevant actors.
- The county drought contingency plan does not yet establish clear responsibility lines between the national and county governments, and is not clear with respect to the mandates, roles and responsibilities of state and non-state actors in the county in terms of clear results frameworks and timelines.
- At present, there is only a contingency plan for drought and for El Niño. This leaves significant gaps for other hazards, such as inter-clan conflicts and insecurity, floods, landslides and disease outbreaks.
- At present, the response to both slow and rapid onset disasters is not based on plans, but is ad hoc.
- The CIDP includes a number of ambiguities, not least with respect to safety nets, and how the development plans are linked to contingency plans. This can lead to activities being carried out in isolation, with the risk of gaps or overlaps in coverage, and reduced positive outcomes.
- The technical competence of county staff to draft policies, guidelines and procedures is inadequate in relation to the demand.

Hunger Governance Indicator 2: Effective and Accountable Institutions

The national safety net programmes under the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services (the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children programme, the Older Persons Cash Transfer and the Persons with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer) only have skeleton staff within the county and often engage county government staff in the Department of Social Services to support the identification and registration of programme beneficiaries. The departments of agriculture and of social services work closely together, as seed and ploughing subsidies are supposed to reach the poorest farmers – for this, the Department of Social Services provides information.

There is no legislated lead institution mandated to coordinate safety nets. However, the CSG, which is co-chaired by the County Governor and the County Commissioner, coordinates activities, although its membership, roles and legal backing remain undefined.

Due to the issues cited above, most national and county institutions and non-state actors plan, implement and report on safety net programmes within their internal structures, but not to a wider forum or to a coordinating institution. This limits the availability of information for decision-making and contributes to weak coordination of interventions.

The CIDP foresees a monitoring and evaluation committee at county and sub-county level; however, this committee has not yet been established. The county and lower level programmes are to feed into the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System. A specific unit with responsibility for monitoring and evaluation of county programmes – and adequate technical capacity – could play a crucial role in the county government's access to information on the performance of its programmes, and enable it to better ensure

accountability and transparency, and to learn.

With respect to early warning and food security assessments, NDMA is the lead institution in the county. No other institution within the county has this function, and data and information from the NDMA's early warning system is used by other actors at the county level. In addition, the Ministry of Health monitors disease and epidemics and coordinates nutrition surveys in the county. These data are used during food security assessments for analysis. Existing traditional early warning information is not systematically used and there is a need to integrate this with the existing system.

A few other non-state actors have their own mechanisms of data collection. At times, this overlaps with the government when the two groups collect data or disseminate information in the same focus areas. Apart from this, the information from state and non-state actors was found to complement each other.

Due to limited funding, not many actors carry out information dissemination or feedback to the community as effectively as they should be. By harmonizing existing initiatives, the data collection and dissemination of information could be made more efficient and effective.

There are no strong interlinkages between the current early warning system and the Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment⁷ methodology, as the latter is designed for rapid-onset disasters like floods and conflicts, while the existing early warning system is meant for drought, a slow-onset disaster.

The county conducts rapid assessments in addition to the routine food security assessment and ongoing drought monitoring. However, no methodology exists for conducting these rapid assessments,

⁷ The Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment is an assessment tool developed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and endorsed by the Kenya Food Security Steering Group.

and neither are there defined tools for the assessment. These rapid assessments are done by developing simple terms of reference as guidelines, and by borrowing from the tools used in long- and short-rains assessments. This, coupled with limited analytical skills at the county level, does not always give the expected results. It is necessary to support the county to develop a well-defined methodology and tools for rapid assessment. Well-structured rapid assessments would help the county identify the effects as well as the number and location of the affected population, and hence assist in planning for emergency response. In contrast to these rapid assessments, the nutrition surveys conducted are using the SMART (standardized monitoring and assessment of relief and transition) methodology and hence apply clear processes and tools.

There is a database for drought early warning datasets; however, it needs to be reviewed and updated. The food security assessment data is, however, not stored in any form of electronic database, hence future retrieval or analysis is not possible. Establishing such a database and training the relevant staff in maintaining it could comprise important support to the county emergency preparedness and response capacity.

The results of food security assessments, nutrition surveys and early warning are well disseminated to the partners at the county level. Other partners appear to have difficulties in understanding the processes, indicators and results of these assessments. These circumstances warrant some sensitization and formalization of the CSG as well as training of relevant partners on early warning and food security assessments.

The dissemination of the early warning information is poor at the community level, mainly due to limited funding to support this. However, even if such dissemination took place, there is only one version of the early warning bulletin that is shared with the technical members, and most

communities would have low or no capacity to understand it. There is therefore a need to support dissemination of early warning information at the sentinel site⁸ level and to provide support in producing more user-friendly communication materials for the communities.

With respect to humanitarian supply chain management, a number of institutions are actively involved in emergency preparedness and response activities within Marsabit County including:

- the Directorate of Cohesion and Integration
- the National Drought Management Authority
- the Directorate of Special Programmes of the national government
- United Nations agencies
- the Kenya Red Cross
- international NGOS, such as World Vision and Veterinaires San Frontiers Germany

The CSG is the overall coordination body in place for all emergency response actions. The various departments of the county government as well as the CSG form committees in the event of an emergency, which bring together the relevant line ministries to coordinate response activities. In the case of drought emergencies, a committee of various government departments is formed with the responsibility to put together a response plan, which is consolidated by NDMA. The Directorate of Cohesion and Integration currently plays the leadership role, although without any legal framework or policy guidelines, which would confer this mandate on the directorate. The arrangement came into being in the course of the peace-building efforts, since the county had been plagued by perennial inter-clan clashes, necessitating a county department to work with the administration department to resolve the conflicts.

⁸ A sentinel site is a randomly selected location that is visited on a monthly basis for situational monitoring.

At the community level, the Directorate of Cohesion and Integration works with community elders in peace-building and promotion activities to mitigate conflict and encourage the peaceful co-existence between different clans.

Institutions engaged in emergency preparedness and response activities have devised a number of risk management strategies, which include but are not limited to:

- community health awareness campaigns;
- drought monitoring and surveillance by NDMA;
- development and relief committees in place at the community level;
- disease and nutrition surveys by the nutrition departments;
- Hunger Safety Net Programme committees at the community level.

The main weaknesses observed with respect to institutions include the following:

- There is no institution with a clear and formalized mandate to coordinate safety nets. This leads to gaps in some areas, and overlaps in others, and may have a bearing on efficient use of scarce resources.
- There is no specific institution within the county government with a specific and formalized mandate for emergency preparedness and response. If this role should be played by the Directorate of Cohesion and Integration, this should be confirmed and its mandate clarified by a specific act of the county.
- Minimum preparedness actions are not in place, largely because no specific entity within the governance structure bears

ultimate responsibility to coordinate emergency preparedness and response.

- An urgent need was identified to set up a directorate of disaster management within the office of the Governor to be responsible for all emergency preparedness and response activities. The directorate would also be responsible for the formulation of comprehensive contingency plans for other hazards and the formulation of strategies for effective emergency response. The directorate should also be the custodian of the technical expertise, systems, standard operating procedures, budgets and operational management for emergency response.
- There are presently no established methodologies and tools for county-led rapid assessments.
- With respect to information management, an electronic and accessible database is currently lacking. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that county and sub-county data are adequately fed into the national integrated monitoring and evaluation system. This could be promoted by specific monitoring and evaluation committees at county and sub-county level, and in particular by a specific county government unit mandated to ensure monitoring and evaluation of county safety nets and emergency response programmes.
- Early warning information is not adequately communicated to communities. Altogether, improved communication with communities could also promote a better use of traditional early warning and more empowerment of communities with respect to contingency planning and programme monitoring.

Hunger Governance Indicator 3: Programme Financing and Strategic Planning

A large proportion of the county resources come from transfers from the National Treasury, with a small proportion raised from local taxes and proceeds from tourism. The Treasury does not transfer the full budget, and often there are delays in receiving transfers.

The CIDP sets out a resource mobilization framework, which includes an integrated resource mobilization strategy. It mentions that the county will attract external funding through public-private partnerships.

The CIDP includes a county-level programme addressing the nutritional status of children under five years as well as other vulnerable groups. However, the CIDP attaches no budget to this programme but acknowledges that partners, such as Concern World Wide, Food for the Hungry – Kenya, UNICEF, WFP and World Vision Kenya, will cover costs. Relief food is also budgeted for at KES 10 million, targeting 1,000 households.

The CIDP dedicates a whole chapter (7.7) to social protection, culture and recreation. This chapter elaborates on the targets for ongoing programmes and new and flagship projects, including applicable transfer values. For example, the Older Persons Cash Transfer programme targets 5,000 persons, and the Persons with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer programme, 700 people across all the sub-counties, with each of the programmes foreseeing monthly transfers of KES 2,000 per person.

While the CIDP acknowledges the importance of safety nets, including defining target beneficiaries and transfer values, it does not give direction on the formulation of guidelines for scalability, determination or adjustment of transfer values, the duration of assistance or an exit plan. For example, the current transfer

value of KES 2,500 is higher than the one spelt out in the CIDP; however, the criteria and process leading to this increase are not formalized.

The county government allocated KES 20 million to the elderly and severely disabled persons in the current financial year (2015/16). While this is an increase from KES 10 million foreseen in the previous financial year, the allocation remains far below the KES 50 million requested (and deemed necessary) by the Department of Social Services.

There is low coverage of financial services in the rural areas that has caused delays in beneficiaries accessing their cash transfers. For example, 15 percent of the elderly and disabled persons have not collected their cash transfers, as they require long travel to a bank outlet. Others, who are using shops to collect their transfers, have reported malpractices.

The CIDP proposes that KES 120 million be allocated to an emergency fund for roads. The county has also passed a legislation that sets up an emergency fund (2 percent of county budget per financial year) to be used to settle unforeseen expenditures, which include compensation to victims of drought, fires, etc. It is not clear how the different slots for emergency funding complement each other.

The county contingency plan budget is outlined in Table 1.

Table 1 Budget for activities under the Marsabit County Contingency Plan

	Budget (KES millions)
Agriculture and food security (of which KES 1.48 billion is for relief food or cash)	1,917.406
Water	1,335.850
Livestock	611.100
Health and nutrition	85.138
Education	132.600
Peace and conflict resolution	147.650
Total	4,239.744

It is unclear to what extent this budget is secured, and from which sources (national, county, partners).

For early warning and food security assessments, the county relies heavily on NDMA, which supports about 90 percent of the budget for this task. The remaining 10 percent is covered by other partners, mostly in information dissemination, though with limited coverage. The county government provides limited funds for rapid assessments in cases where these are needed – however, this is done in an unplanned, ad hoc manner. The combined resources are insufficient; hence assessments and monitoring are often not conducted as desired.

National partners also finance nutrition surveys. The county government, however, plays a role in supporting these activities since this is a devolved function. However, financial support from the county government for the exercise has been limited and there are usually financing gaps. The early warning system, however, has not received any support from the county government and the bulk of the financing is from the national government through NDMA. Only a few non-state actors (include ADESO, Concern Worldwide and Veterinaires San Frontiers Germany) have supported some elements, like information dissemination and capacity development. Despite this support, the resources have been limited and these activities have not been conducted to an adequate extent.

The financial support that comes from the county and other actors is not inscribed in county plans and is therefore not sustainable. The support from non-state actors has limited coverage, since none of them works in the entire county and they all have quite limited resources. There is a need for NDMA and the county government to discuss how they can facilitate funding.

Marsabit County, like all other counties, relies on the transfer of funds from the national government to finance all its operations, including emergency preparedness and response. In the financial year 2015/16, KES

40 million was set aside as the County Emergency Fund. This is reserved for emergency response only, where the county executive member responsible for finance may make emergency payments and issue monies for emergency requirements if satisfied that a situation is an emergency. The amount is considered inadequate for the needs. The drought contingency plan foresees programme costs of KES 4.23 billion, and the current El Niño contingency plan requires funding of about KES 700 million to be implemented. It is not clear where the required resources will come from.

Disbursements from the National Treasury often arrive late and remain below the established budget. This impacts negatively on emergency preparedness and response activities. While contingency plans for both the expected El Niño rains and drought are in place, no contingency funds have been set aside. Once the emergency fund is exhausted, the county relies on making appeals to development partners and the national government and, in worst-case scenarios, will have to pass supplementary budgets to cut back on development expenditure and redirect the funds for emergency response activities.

NDMA's drought contingency fund at the national level is limited compared with needs. For example, the county drew KES 16 million in the financial year 2015/16 compared to KES 39 million in financial year 2014/15, against a county drought emergency response budget of KES 200 million. This represented just under 20 percent, and while the county government and development partners contributed additional funds, the budget was not covered, hence compromising the effectiveness of the whole response.

Resource mobilization is currently carried out by an economic adviser in the Governor's office, but it was not possible to establish how the resource mobilization is structured.

The county also benefits from the Constituency Development Fund. However,

this is entirely managed by the respective parliamentarians, without any influence of the county government.

In summary, safety nets and emergency preparedness and response activities are costed (in the CIDP and the drought contingency plan and the EL Niño contingency plan). However, this does not mean that the required funds will be available when needed.

The main observed weaknesses with respect to finance include the following:

- Fund transfers from national to county level come late and stay below the county budgets.
- A resource mobilization strategy for safety nets and emergency preparedness and response is integrated in the CIDP, yet not operationalized.
- Except for the Hunger Safety Net Programme, the county has no information on the support that households receive from other safety nets.
- Evidence of actual needs perceived by the county was not adequately documented. This makes it difficult to mobilize the required resources.
- Neither the CIDP nor the contingency plans clarify how the foreseen budgets can be secured.
- The county's emergency fund remains far below the funding needs for emergency preparedness and response.
- The resource mobilization strategy included in the CIDP has many good elements, but does not ultimately answer the question of how safety nets and emergency preparedness and response activities should be financed.

- The present procedures in the disbursements of emergency funds are seen to be inadequate to ensure full transparency and accountability.

Hunger Governance Indicator 4: Programme Design and Management

The county has the following safety net programmes:

- provision of seeds and fertilizer for farmers;
- provision of subsidies for tractors services;
- the Enterprise Development Fund;
- education bursaries for students in institutions above primary schools;
- provision of meals in early childhood development centres not covered by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and WFP;
- an emergency fund managed by the county executive committee member for finance;
- a cash transfer programme for the older persons.

The Hunger Safety Net Programme has its own guidelines for targeting beneficiaries and programme implementation. For other safety nets, there are no written, clear and transparent eligibility criteria other than normal county budgetary and financial accounting procedures. Where criteria are established, they are not always firmly implemented and monitored. Each programme has its own processes, which ensure accountability to varying degrees (lower e.g. for the distribution of certified relief seeds and tractor services).

Seeds should go to the poorest farmers; however, who actually gets how much and

if those who receive seeds actually meet the intended criteria is not monitored. The tractor subsidies are for all farmers, and such an open approach raises questions on whether resources are wasted on those who could afford the services without support. The tractor subsidy service has proved to be extremely costly, and the county could wish to engage relevant development partners to assist with instituting an efficient model.

There is an operational contingency fund under NDMA, but it is not clear how this fund can be linked with community contingency plans and the emergency fund under the county government.

As regards early warning and food security assessments, there are sufficient staff to carry out assessments as well as surveys and early warning monitoring. However, since devolution and the establishment of counties, the majority of staff who had been trained to conduct assessments and monitoring have since moved or were deployed or re-assigned to other stations. This has left very few technical staff at the county level who are sufficiently qualified to carry out assessments. The county mostly relies on the team from the national level, which guides the assessment process. There has been a desire also from the national government to empower the counties to conduct credible assessments independently. This is a gap that needs to be filled.

The interlinkages of early warning triggers with response mechanisms is good within the county. The early warning system in the past has triggered action for nutrition surveys and screening to be conducted. It has also triggered responses to drought, prompting the sectors to jointly plan and prepare multi-sectoral response plans guided by the existing drought contingency plan. The main challenge here has been that the response plans that are prepared are not usually fully funded.

The quality of the data collected also needs to be strengthened since at times, due to limited resources, proper validation and data quality assessments have not been secured. Partners feel that the only available data that is consistent and has the widest coverage of the county is the data from NDMA, though there need to be efforts to ensure that its quality is improved. Additional capacities of county staff that need to be strengthened include the ability to understand the datasets of assessment and early warning as well as how analyses are carried out to facilitate decision-making and credibility of the information generated.

In the area of emergency preparedness and response, the technical team noted that the guidelines, standards and protocols for providing emergency assistance in the county were inadequate. There were no standard operating procedures to regulate emergency response processes; and the absence of a lead institution to coordinate emergency response issues considerably undermines efforts to put in place such systems.

A number of actors who carry out activities within the county have signed memoranda of understanding with the relevant line ministries and government departments. It is not clear, however, whether these plans carry explicit provisions regarding emergency preparedness and response, or if they only concern the implementation of partner projects in the county.

With respect to the delivery of in-kind humanitarian assistance to crisis-prone areas, the low road density in the county and the difficult terrain would significantly hinder effective delivery mechanisms. Although the county reported having rapid activation contracts in place, these did not have provision for specialized 4x4 and 6x6 trucks for use in flooding and slippery roads, which are common phenomena in the county - especially in the Chalbi Desert - whenever substantial rains are received. As stated in the CIDP, the Nairobi-Addis highway through Moyale is the only all-weather road in the vast county, covering just about 400 km out of the 2,431 km road network.



The CIDP includes the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis shown in Table 2 with respect to disaster risk reduction.

Table 2 Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis in the Marsabit County Integrated Development Plan

Strengths	Opportunities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existence of management authorities that regulate various activities in the county (e.g. NEMA, KWS, WARMA) • Presence of personnel who can map disaster-prone areas • Existence of knowledge on traditional early warning systems, e.g. migrating birds • Presence of NGOs and community-based organizations conducting advocacy campaigns • Existence of county information-sharing forums • Availability of devolved emergency funds e.g. Constituency Development Fund 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existence of the current devolved government structures for cascading disaster risk reduction information • Presence of several civil society organizations undertaking surveys on disaster • Existence of devolved funding to fund income-generating activities • Existence of financial institutions availing loans affordable to the community e.g. Saccos
Weaknesses	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of disaster risk reduction policy at devolved level • Lack of disaster risk reduction awareness at community level • Low levels of awareness on environmental management • Gaps in coordination of disaster risk reduction • Inadequate personnel • Inadequate medical supplies • Lack of specialized disease-handling facilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate capacity and personnel on disaster • Rigidity of the risk-prone communities to act on early warning signs • Inadequate technology to early warning system prediction • Political interference to suit individual interests • Unpredictable climatic conditions

For programme design and management, the main observed weaknesses include the following:

- There is a lack of formalization of county safety nets and response programmes: there should be for each safety net and response programme clear, written and approved eligibility criteria, selection procedures and monitoring to ensure that the intended beneficiaries in fact receive the intended support.
- County stakeholders, including politicians, lack an understanding of safety nets. The knowledge on safety nets is important for decision-makers and officers to enrich informed debate on formulation of legislation.
- Technical skills are inadequate amongst county staff in the area of emergency preparedness and response for a wide array of skills including policy formulation, early warning and assessments, response analysis (food or cash) and programme preparation and implementation, including cash transfer mechanisms and humanitarian supply chain management (transport contracting, food assistance planning, warehousing and storage and quality control for relief commodities).
- There is currently no county institution with a formalized, legal mandate for emergency preparedness and response.
- There is currently no dedicated institution that has sufficient levels of adequately skilled staff, tools, equipment, systems, standard operating procedures and processes required to handle and manage emergency preparedness and response.
- The available information on safety nets and emergency response

programmes and beneficiaries is not systematically integrated and accessible for knowledge management, monitoring and accountability.

- There is currently no systematic and formalized complaints and grievances system for all county safety nets and emergency response programmes.

Hunger Governance

Indicator 5: Continuity and Sustained National Capacity/ Civil Society Voice

There is a political will to support the most vulnerable, but currently there is no long-term strategy for safety nets. The existing programmes co-exist, but are not linked to each other, regardless of whether they are county, national or partner programmes.

The CIDP, in its section on resource mobilization, proposes that the county should carry out comprehensive planning of grants to finance capital projects, with clear proof of long-term sustainability and ownership. The CIDP also urges the county government to develop clear strategies to raise revenue. Two avenues for the latter can be highlighted:

- Funds from the National Treasury are projected to grow by at least 20 percent per annum for the next five years as more functions are bundled and transferred to counties. Whether this projection is realistic depends on the criteria that will be adopted by the Commission for Revenue Allocation and on the amount that will actually be allocated to the county governments. It should also be noted that even increasing allocations and transfers will not necessarily mean a significant increase of funds available for safety nets and emergency

preparedness and response, as the increased transfers will be linked to increased tasks and responsibilities.

- To attract investments (from local and international investors) the county government is urged to aggressively improve its key infrastructure to ease the movement of goods and persons, and improve its communication and access to markets outside the county.

Concerning early warning and food security assessments, different areas in the county are covered to a varying extent by national, county and partner programmes. Similarly, the level of resources dedicated to the different areas is not consistent. This means that some areas receive multiple sources of support, whereas others receive none. Harmonization and coordination of programmes is required to ensure that interventions are evenly distributed to cover all the vulnerable parts of the county.

At present, most actors only come in to address gaps or shortages in emergency response on an ad hoc basis and with insecure funding. The sustainability of interventions needs to be strengthened by ensuring that resources are allocated and there are long-term commitments by various actors.

During emergencies, coordination takes place through the CSGs, where all the involved sectors including non-state actors come together and develop response plans. This is a sustainable initiative since it is usually led by government. The county therefore has the capacity to design the response plan. In addition to the CSG, sub-county steering groups coordinate emergency issues at the sub-county level. The fact that these structures are anchored to government institutions makes the arrangement sustainable. However, the role of the CSG is much reduced in non-emergency times.

The sustainability challenge noted in these structures is that some non-state actors have a limited geographic or thematic

coverage, depending on the finances of their particular programme. Unlike the state actors, it becomes difficult to have long-term plans when the key implementing partner is a non-state actor with insecure programme funding.

Marsabit, like many other counties in the arid and semi-arid lands, does not have a clear strategy for sustaining the emergency preparedness and response agenda. This is largely because more effort was being channelled to catching up with the rest of the counties, i.e. addressing past marginalization. This includes many urgently needed short-term investments, at the detriment of a longer-term plan with built-in sustainability.

The engagement and participation of the community in emergency response activities is low, in part due to the high illiteracy levels and partly due to the vastness of the county requiring significant – presently not available – resources to support a meaningful engagement. There is need to link community action plans for emergency preparedness and response with the county contingency plans – this would significantly enhance the contingency plans' relevance. For emergency preparedness and response activities to be sustainable, community engagement – along with the engagement of other stakeholders, including international NGOs and United Nations agencies – needs to be strengthened.

The main observed weaknesses include the following:

- There is no resource mobilization plan that would enable non-state actors to identify strategic areas to support development initiatives.
- Partnerships are not formalized in such a standardized way that would ensure that information on all NGOs active in the county, and the beneficiaries of their respective

programmes, is readily available for county planning. This undermines the county government's ability to effectively provide coordination to avoid duplication and to develop plans to ensure sustainability of the initiatives in the long term.

- The existing safety nets are not adequately linked by a long-term strategy that sets common goals and links the existing programmes with each other (e.g. asset creation and credit schemes or other agricultural/livestock support schemes)
- Funding levels – overall and for individual programmes – are not stable and predictable, and need to increase.
- The methodologies for the preparation of safety nets and emergency response (e.g. with respect to beneficiary targeting, registration, community involvement, or monitoring and reporting, or complaints mechanisms) are not sufficiently harmonized, e.g. by joint methodologies or a standard that all county programme methodologies have to align to.
- The available information on safety nets and emergency response programmes is not sufficiently integrated and managed to enable lessons learned to be identified and incorporated into future programmes.
- The present resource mobilization strategy for emergency preparedness and response is inadequate. This is tied to the establishment of a disaster management unit to take forward the county mission and vision on emergency preparedness and response.
- The monitoring and evaluation for the county programmes is not yet



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sufficiently guided by a common framework and managed by a specific unit. Such a framework and unit would ensure that the implementation of all county programmes is monitored, that gained knowledge is adequately

managed, and that feedback is used to improve the learning and subsequent programming processes.

- Communities are not yet sufficiently engaged in emergency preparedness and response plans and activities.

4

PROPOSALS FOR CAPACITY SUPPORT

Proposed capacity support encompasses a number of areas:

Policies, Regulation, Plans and Strategies

1. Assist in drafting and submitting a county-level disaster management bill for consideration by the county assembly. The bill should, at the minimum, create and empower an institution to handle emergency preparedness and response issues in the county.
2. Assist in the review of the county drought contingency plan with a view to establishing clear responsibilities between the national and county governments, and clear mandates, roles and responsibilities of state and non-state actors in the county – with clear results frameworks and timelines. It is also important to clarify how the budgets outlined in the contingency plan can be secured.
3. Review the contingency plan to ensure that it makes adequate provision for preparedness and response in relation to hazards other than drought, such as inter-clan conflicts and insecurity, floods, landslides and disease outbreaks. At present, there is only a drought contingency plan and an El Niño contingency plan. This leaves important gaps for other hazards.
4. The CIDP includes a number of ambiguities, not least with respect to safety nets, and how the development plans are linked to contingency plans. If the county wants to review the CIDP, discussions need to be held amongst stakeholders to ensure that such ambiguities are addressed. Alternatively, this could be done when the next CIDP is formulated in 2017.
5. Assist with further work on a resource mobilization strategy for diversified and

medium-term term funding – combined with prioritization of safety net and emergency preparedness and response activities.

6. Facilitate discussions and preparation of formalized cooperation with non-state actors, including their registration, and a formalization of the CSG.

Guidelines, Procedures and Systems

1. Support the technical competence of relevant county staff to draft policies, guidelines and procedures. Capacity development could be channelled towards this area in the form of developing a manual, and classroom and on-the-job training, coaching, and mentoring of the staff.
2. Support the county's technical capacities to formalize a harmonized approach to response analysis and programme preparation (e.g. how to decide which benefits (food, cash, quantities) beneficiaries should receive, how to establish eligibility criteria, and how to target, select and register beneficiaries).
3. Support the implementation of swift response procedures – e.g. for i) food logistics (including roads assessments, storage, transport, pre-positioning, distribution and monitoring), ii) cash transfers (including identifying the best options for payment mechanisms, agreements with financial service providers, securing rapid access to funds, securing a transparent and efficient flow of funds), iii) accountability, monitoring and reporting, and iv) a mechanism for filing complaints or grievances or addressing any problems or ambiguities experienced by beneficiaries.
4. Strengthen accountability mechanisms for emergency preparedness and response.

Coordinate and Stimulate Comprehensive Participation in Safety Nets and Emergency Preparedness and Response throughout the County

1. Assist in setting up a disaster management directorate by supporting equipment and technical knowledge transfer to staff.
2. Support decision-makers, officers and partners to understand early warning and food security assessment concepts, tools, methodologies and results.
3. Enhance skills and means of the county to conduct hazard analyses and communicate early warning and food security information effectively with communities, and to mobilize these communities to engage in emergency preparedness and response.

Information and Knowledge Management

1. Support technical capacities of county staff for data collection concerning safety net needs assessments. This would include skills and equipment required to access and use the national single registry.

2. Support the ongoing formation of a monitoring and evaluation committee at county and sub-county level such that their programmes feed into the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System.
3. Strengthen the existing communications department to include a knowledge and documentation centre that stores and shares information, identifies lessons learned and provides feedback for subsequent programming cycles.
4. Support the development of a methodology for rapid assessments to be conducted by the county during emergency response planning and decision-making.
5. Support development of a food and nutrition security database to improve data capture, analysis and storage.
6. Support dissemination of early warning and food security information to the communities.

5

METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY OF BASELINE CAPACITY INDICATOR SCORES

As WFP is increasingly supporting national capacities in food and nutrition security, the organization has developed a methodology for identifying a national capacity indicator through which the potential outcomes of its work can be measured. WFP's corporate level has provided a framework, which WFP Kenya was adapted and completed to fit i) with the specific situation concerning safety nets and ii) the ongoing process of devolution.

A national capacity indicator is, in principle, calculated by averaging capacity scores in three areas (social safety nets, productive safety nets, and disaster management). For Kenya, these areas were re-drawn to encompass safety nets (both social and productive ones), and emergency preparedness and response.

Within each area, capacities are analysed with respect to five areas of hunger governance:

- policy and legislative environment
- effective and accountable institutions
- financing and strategic planning
- programme design and management
- continuity and sustained national capacity/civil society voice

For each of these hunger governance areas, a hunger governance indicator is established by averaging scores for five core capacity characteristics:

- the level of commitment and political will;
- the efficiency and effectiveness of delivery of programmes and services;
- the ability to mobilize resources and partnerships to make these programmes possible;

- the sustainability and stability of institutions and programmes;
- the ability to innovate and improve to ensure that programmes can adapt to changing needs and conditions.

The county teams identified whether for a given core capacity characteristic the level of capacity is latent (score 1), emergent (score 2), moderate (score 3) or self-sufficient (score 4).

WFP had prepared the capacity gaps and needs assessment process by formulating a long list of specific questions that guided the discussion of each core capacity characteristic under each hunger governance area for both safety nets and emergency preparedness and response. For emergency preparedness and response, two separate question guides were prepared, one for early warning and food security assessment, and one for humanitarian supply chain management.

The county teams discussed the questions and established scores for each core capacity characteristic. All scores have the same weight. Where several questions had been formulated for the same core capacity characteristic, their scores were averaged. An aggregate score for each hunger governance indicator was then calculated by averaging the five core capacity characteristic scores. The hunger governance indicator scores for early warning and food security assessment and for humanitarian supply chain management were averaged into one hunger governance indicator for emergency preparedness and response. Finally, the hunger governance indicators for safety nets and emergency preparedness and response were averaged into one composite county capacity indicator. This is illustrated Table 3.

Table 3 Methodology for calculating hunger governance indicator scores

	HUNGER GOVERNANCE AREA	1: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT	2: EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE INSTITUTIONS	3: PROGRAMME FINANCING AND STRATEGIC PLANNING	4: PROGRAMME DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT	5: CONTINUITY AND SUSTAINED NATIONAL CAPACITY/CIVIL SOCIETY VOICE
Row	SAFETY NETS					
1	CCC 1	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
2	CCC 2	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
3	CCC 3	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
4	CCC 4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
5	CCC 5	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
6	Hunger governance indicator (mean of rows 1–5)	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores
7	Overall baseline for safety nets	Mean of hunger governance indicators (mean of row 6 values)				
EARLY WARNING AND FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT						
8	CCC 1	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
9	CCC 2	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
10	CCC 3	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
11	CCC 4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
12	CCC 5	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
13	Hunger governance indicator (mean of rows 8–12)	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores
14	Overall baseline for early warning and food security	Mean of hunger governance indicators (mean of row 13 values)				
HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT						
15	CCC 1	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
16	CCC 2	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
17	CCC 3	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
18	CCC 4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
19	CCC 5	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
20	Hunger governance indicator (mean of rows 15–19)	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores
21	Overall baseline for humanitarian supply chain management	Mean of hunger governance indicators (mean of row 20 values)				
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE (COMBINED EARLY WARNING AND FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT+HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT)						
22	Hunger governance indicator (mean of rows 13 and 20)	Mean of humanitarian supply chain management and early warning and food security assessment	Mean of humanitarian supply chain management and early warning and food security assessment	Mean of humanitarian supply chain management and early warning and food security assessment	Mean of humanitarian supply chain management and early warning and food security assessment	Mean of humanitarian supply chain management and early warning and food security assessment
23	Overall baseline for emergency preparedness and response	Mean of hunger governance indicators (mean of row 22 values)				
COMBINED SAFETY NETS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE						
24	Hunger governance indicator (mean of rows 6 and 22)	Mean of emergency preparedness and response and safety nets	Mean of emergency preparedness and response and safety nets	Mean of emergency preparedness and response and safety nets	Mean of emergency preparedness and response and safety nets	Mean of emergency preparedness and response and safety nets
	County capacity indicator	Mean of hunger governance indicators (mean of row 24 values)				

Note: CCC – core capacity characteristic

The composite county capacity indicator will form the baseline against which any outcomes of the planned capacity support programmes between the county and WFP will be measured. Detailed assessments of progress can be based on the more detailed scores for the core capacity characteristics and hunger governance indicators included in the completed question guides in annexes 1-3.

Results of the Capacity Gaps and Needs Assessment Process

The scores for each core capacity characteristic under each hunger governance indicator for safety nets and emergency preparedness and response are provided in Table 4. The hunger governance indicator scores for safety nets and emergency preparedness and response (disaggregated by humanitarian supply chain management and early warning and food security assessment are summarized here:

The aggregate baseline capacity score for **hunger governance indicator 1 (policy and legislative environment)** is

- **2.2** for safety nets and
- **2.4** for emergency preparedness and response (2.3 for early warning and food security assessment and 2.5 for humanitarian supply chain management).

A higher score could be achieved if i) the county had access to the national single registry in order to plan and ascertain that the coverage of cash transfers to vulnerable target groups is increasing, ii) there was a disaster management act which determines clear roles and responsibilities for coordination and management of emergency preparedness and response with respect to all relevant hazards, and that ensures that specific early warning information triggers prompt action, including food and nutrition security

assessment and response planning, iii) the interrelation and complementarity between county and national safety nets and with emergency relief programmes was clarified, iv) there were comprehensive and interlinked county and sub-county contingency plans that are known and owned by the population, v) the county had access to information on which households are vulnerable and receive what support from which programmes, vi) there was a county database on vulnerable households, vii) there were clear guidelines on programme management and monitoring, and viii) there was a transparent procedure for the use of the emergency fund.

The baseline capacity score for **hunger governance indicator 2 (effective and accountable institutions)** is

- **2.0** for safety nets and
- **2.3** for emergency preparedness and response (2.3 for early warning and food security assessment and 2.4 for humanitarian supply chain management).

A higher score could be achieved if i) there was a clear institution designated to coordinate safety nets, with access to the national single registry and the capacity to use its information – e.g. for the harmonization and coordination of cash and food transfers – and, under the guidance of county government institutions and non-state actors, to plan, implement and report on safety net programmes, ii) there was an institution responsible for emergency preparedness and response and the formulation and updating of comprehensive contingency plans, iii) there was an established methodology for rapid food and nutrition security assessments, iv) there was a functioning information management system in the form of an accessible electronic database, v) early warning information was effectively communicated to communities, and e.g. traditional early warning information available in communities was considered,

vi) there was improved coordination of data collection and management where hazard analysis could be harmonized by different actors, and vii) a county government unit was specifically mandated and capacitated to ensure adequate monitoring and evaluation of all county programmes, and that information was fed into the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System.

The aggregate baseline capacity score for **hunger governance indicator 3 (programme financing and strategic planning)** is

- **2.0** for safety nets and
- **2.1** for emergency preparedness and response (1.9 for early warning and food security assessment and 2.3 for humanitarian supply chain management).

A higher score could be achieved if i) there was access to adequate funds for priority safety nets as well as relief food or cash at the different stages of the drought cycle, ii) there was quality early warning, food and nutrition security assessment and analysis, iii) resources were used more efficiently by analysing information from the national single registry and information from other programme providers, iv) a realistic and operationalized resource mobilization strategy was in place, which, based on documented evidence of needs, increases the likelihood of predictable and adequate funding, and v) there was transparent and clear accountability for all safety nets and emergency relief programmes, including internal county procedures for disbursements from the emergency fund.

The aggregate baseline capacity score for **hunger governance indicator 4 (programme design and management)** is

- **2.0** for safety nets and
- **2.0** for emergency preparedness and response (1.9 for early warning and food security assessment and 2.0 for humanitarian supply chain management).

A higher score could be achieved if i) all safety nets or other vouchers or free services in the county were formalized through approved guidelines that describe objectives, eligibility criteria, selection procedures, distribution or provision mechanisms, and monitoring and reporting so that support reaches the intended beneficiaries – and is efficient, ii) the relevant county stakeholders, including politicians, had a good understanding of safety nets and their role, iii) there was a system that ensures good-quality data is used for decision-making, iv) the relevant county staff possessed the required technical skills for policy formulation, early warning and food and nutrition security assessment and reporting, response analysis, and programme preparation and implementation, including cash transfer payment mechanisms and humanitarian supply chain management (including the securing of food safety), v) there was practical application of standard operating procedures at county and sub-county levels, and vi) there was an integrate information system for emergency preparedness and response and knowledge management, including a structured approach to promote systematic learning.

The aggregate baseline capacity score for **hunger governance indicator 5 (continuity and sustained national capacity/civil society voice)** is

- **2.0** for safety nets and
- **2.1** for emergency preparedness and response (2.2 for early warning and food security assessment and 2.0 for humanitarian supply chain management).

A higher score could be achieved if i) there was a longer-term strategy for safety nets with common goals and links with other programmes of the county, ii) the partnerships between the county government and non-state actors were more formalized to allow better coordination of interventions in



safety nets and emergency preparedness and response, iii) there were joint methodologies that are aligned with national guidance with respect to targeting, beneficiary registration, community involvement, and monitoring and reporting, iv) there was a harmonized information management system (ideally managed by

a specific, designated county government department) that is linked to a monitoring and evaluation framework and includes a system to feedback experience, and v) communities were more effectively involved and engaged in emergency preparedness and response plans and activities.

Table 4 Hunger governance indicator and county capacity scores – Marsabit

HUNGER GOVERNANCE AREA	1: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT	2: EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE INSTITUTIONS	3: PROGRAMME FINANCING AND STRATEGIC PLANNING	4: PROGRAMME DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT	5: CONTINUITY AND SUSTAINED NATIONAL CAPACITY/CIVIL SOCIETY VOICE
SAFETY NETS					
CCC 1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
CCC 2	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	-
CCC 3	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
CCC 4	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
CCC 5	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Hunger governance indicator	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Overall baseline for safety nets	2.0				
EARLY WARNING AND FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT					
CCC 1	2.4	2.5	2.2	1.5	-
CCC 2	1.8	2.8	1.5	2.0	2.5
CCC 3	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.0
CCC 4	-	1.7	-	-	2.5
CCC 5	3.0	-	-	-	1.8
Hunger governance indicator	2.3	2.3	1.9	1.9	2.2
Overall baseline for early warning and food security	2.1				
HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT					
CCC 1	2.0	1.0	1.5	2.0	1.5
CCC 2	3.0	2.3	2.5	1.4	2.5
CCC 3	3.5	3.0	3.2	2.5	2.5
CCC 4	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
CCC 5	2.0	2.7	-	2.0	1.5
Hunger governance indicator	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.0	2.0
Overall baseline for humanitarian supply chain management	2.2				
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE					
Hunger governance indicator	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.0	2.1
Overall baseline for emergency preparedness and response	2.2				
COMBINED SAFETY NETS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE					
Hunger governance indicator	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0
County capacity indicator	2.1				

Note: CCC – core capacity characteristic

ANNEX 1: MARSABIT CAPACITY GAPS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT: SAFETY NETS

Social and Productive Safety Nets including Emergency Assistance Planning, Resilience, and Recovery

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
HGI 1 - Policy and legal environment			
1.	To what extent is the importance of safety nets (social/productive), including in emergency assistance planning, resilience and recovery adequately reflected in national/county development plans, policies, strategies, laws, etc.? (CCC1)	Millennium Development Goals, Constitution, Vision 2010, CIDP and spatial plans Instruments: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National policy on development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme (ASDSP) Sector plans Marsabit CIDP (currently under review). National policies on Agriculture, Livestock and Veterinary services are still in draft form. 	2.0
1.a	List relevant instruments from the constitution to national and county development plans, policies, strategies, etc. as applicable. In particular, is there a national/county level multi-sectorial SN policy that addresses the needs of the affected communities? Do relevant instruments specify the roles, objectives and expected results for the different sectors?		
1.b	Are these instruments up to date, e.g. do they adequately reflect the changing environment due to the devolved government structure? Do they take into account different kinds of assistance, including emergency assistance planning as well as recovery and resilience building?	The status of policies and bills on safety nets is not very clear. Policies are not yet concluded for various reasons: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The need to take into account constitutional requirements for the devolved functions. Intergovernmental consultation are taking longer than foreseen. The legal framework required to operationalize policies is not passed by the county. County government departments have limited capacity to draft bills. 	
1.c	Which are the roles foreseen for national/county level actors based on above listed development plans, policies, strategies, laws?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> County departments/sectors do not have adequate skills for policy development. NDMA manages drought response contingency plan for the national government. Activation of NDMA-managed contingency is based on the magnitude of the hazard. Activation of contingency plans is sometimes delayed. Response by the county to slow and rapid onset hazards is not based on and existing plan but rather done on an ad hoc and need basis. There is no clear policy framework or plan on disaster management at county level. The foreseen disaster management fund is not in place. Response to emergencies is sometimes delayed by lack of a prior plan or bureaucracy requirements for activation. 	
1.d	In particular, does government (at national and sub-national level) prepare contingency plans in adequate intervals that foresee the provision of emergency assistance? If yes, how? If no, what are the challenges?		
1.e	Do relevant instruments include clear objectives and targets related to relevant SN indicators?	It is not fully clear how the county government uses hazard analysis information for planning.	
1.f	Does the national/county government have a policy/strategy of mobilizing and using relief resources (food or cash) complemented with development resources (human, financial, and/or other resources) to build resilience against droughts? (CCC2)		

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
2.	How well do relevant instruments effectively identify and address the needs of the affected population both in emergency and non-emergency situations? [CCC 2] Are there instruments?	Existing instruments and programmes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Livestock insurance • Hunger safety net • National social protection programmes for orphans and vulnerable children, people with severe disabilities and the elderly • County social protection fund for the elderly and disabled • Asset creation programme in Moyale 	2.0
2.a	Are the relevant instruments being implemented? State for each identified instrument?	Gaps with respect to these instruments: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Different safety nets define vulnerability differently. • No database of possible and current beneficiaries is in place • Targeting process and criteria are not generally agreed upon irrespective of the intervention. Existing targeting guidelines are not harmonized. Different safety net use different methods. • County and national social protection funds have defined target groups. • Even formally approved policies are weak in terms of being translated to operational work plans with timelines. 	
2.b	Are there gaps in the existing instruments? Are there important groups, or important needs, that are not addressed by the identified instruments? Which?	What is required: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Livelihood mapping • Beneficiaries database or county single registry • Legislation guiding safety nets 	
2.c	For safety nets, how are affected populations being defined? For SSN, is the definition of vulnerability the selection criteria? How is vulnerability being defined, i.e. which groups does it imply (orphans, disabled, elderly, etc.) and which criteria are being used to describe various degrees of vulnerability (vulnerable, most vulnerable, etc.)? Which type of vulnerabilities are being considered (food security and malnutrition, which others)? Which selection criteria are effective?		
2.d	Are intentions and policies supported by adequate legislation and regulations, and translated into action plans with clear responsibilities, results frameworks and timelines?		
2.e	Are legislative changes necessary to support the implementation of policies and strategies addressing needs of affected groups (e.g. policies for procurement of goods and services; legislation on food fortification, import restrictions on certain foods and other commodities, legal barriers to access to medical services for specific groups)?		
3.	When devising safety net instruments, both in emergency and non-emergency situations, how has the government established partnerships with relevant key stakeholders (United Nations, civil society, private sector, research institutes, other governments, etc.), specifically with those players that have a direct role in promoting safety nets? [CCC3]	The county involves the following key stakeholders when devising safety net programmes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communities • Financial institutions (Equity, KCB) • NGOs • Private sector • Legislators • National government representatives • Legal advisors 	2.0
3.a	Which sectors and non-state partners are reflected in the relevant policies and strategies addressing needs of SN affected groups?	However, the county does not always have a clear overview of all partner programmes and interventions which undermines effective coordination.	
3.b	Which are the key players in safety net related partnerships of national and county government? Are their current efforts to enhance partnerships? If so, which strategies are being pursued? If not, which are challenges that the government might face in doing so?	The following could address these shortcomings: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment and strengthening of county coordination committee. • Strengthening of sector coordination structures • Mapping of partners and interventions 	
3.c	Do the relevant documents include mechanisms for partner coordination/policy dialogue? If not, is there a need?		
4.	How effectively do national and county development plans/policies, and other safety net related instruments link to other relevant instruments and programmes ? What are the notable differences occurring in emergency vs. non-emergency states ? [Coordination mechanisms] [CCC4]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existing safety net interventions implemented by the national and county governments and non-state actors are not well coordinated. • There is no common understanding of the common objective of the safety nets, or how the different safety nets can or should complement each other. 	3.0
4.a	Is there coherence between the national/county SN policy and action plan and sector plans in relation to addressing needs of the affected populations?		
4.b	Are county level plans and strategies aligned with national SN and relevant sector policies?		
4.c	Are there mechanisms in place to encourage trial of innovative approaches for addressing the needs of the affected population?		
4.d	Do safety net related instruments take cognizance of the differences in geographic areas, gender, age, and the distribution of hunger and food and nutrition insecurity?		

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
5.	Elaborate how the relevant national and sub-national instruments in support of safety nets are responsive to changing situations and needs with respect to emergencies, resilience building and recovery measures? (CCC5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Procurement procedures (as laid down in the Public Procurement Act, PPA) delay the activation of response interventions. • In some cases, the scaling up and down of interventions is based on detailed or rapid assessments. • There is no clear communication to beneficiaries on the programme period, and no clear exit plan. 	2.0
5.a	How has the emergency assistance provided in recent years been adjusted to varying levels of needs?		
5.b	Have emergency assistance plans in recent years been timely to ensure adequate response?		
5.c	Is there a system for policy review and updates in place that uses current SN analyses and includes engagement and endorsement by all sectors/main stakeholders?		
5.d	Are relevant SN policies and strategies updated regularly in line with changing conditions, needs and global evidence?		
		Aggregate score for HGI 1:	2.2

HGI 2 – Effective and Accountable Institutions

1.	Is there a designated lead institution within the national and/or county government with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the function of planning and management of safety nets, both with respect to emergency assistance and resilience? (CCC1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At the county level, there is no specific institution mandated to coordinate safety nets. • Hunger Safety Net Programme is coordinated by NDMA • Response to emergencies is coordinated through the CSG, but more on an ad hoc basis. • There are parallel lines of responsibility for the coordination of emergency response (national vs. county). 	2.0
1.a	Which institution? If there are several institutions (e.g. central and county-level), how do their mandates complement, overlap, or contradict each other? What does the coordination between ministries look like at the national/county level?		
1.b	Do the mandates of relevant institutions ensure that all affected people are adequately covered by emergency assistance? Are there gaps between institutional mandates? Which?		
1.c	Who is in charge, responsible and accountable for which tasks?		
1.d	Who bears overall responsibility for the institution's performance?		
1.e	How is leadership chosen and defined?		
1.f	What is the reporting structure?		
1.g	Does the institution (or any of the institutions) have a specific food security and nutrition mandate/focus? If so, which?		
1.h	Has there been a historical evolution of the mandate? If so, how and why?		
2.	In the last three years, have there been significant changes in size, growth, programmes, leadership, responsibilities and structure of the lead institution, in particular due to poverty, emergency situations, resilience building or recovery? If yes, please elaborate. (CCC2)	In 2015, due to El Niño early warning, a county El Niño Response Committee was established. It will not continue to exist after the El Niño.	2.0
3.	Do relevant institutions have systems, processes and resources (e.g. staff, knowledge, guidelines/ procedures and equipment) to be efficient and accountable in both emergency and non-emergency situations? Provide answers for each relevant institution; (CCC2)	Important inefficiencies are reported. Reasons for these include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uncoordinated interventions • Budgetary constraints • Inadequate skills to implement safety net programmes 	2.0
3.a	Answer for each relevant institution – when discussing if systems, process and resources are sufficient, use the test question if safety net benefits in recent years have in fact been provided in an adequate and timely manner to the right people – and if not, why.		

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
3.b	How does the day-to-day work of safety net management function? Are there any bottlenecks? What could be the underlying reasons for these? How do these differ from emergency assistance planning?		
3.c	If there are any bottlenecks, which would be the most important functions to strengthen, and how could they be strengthened (different separation of tasks, revised work flows, more staff, training for staff, working equipment, operational budget, etc.)?		
4.	Provide details on whether comprehensive and effective multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordination mechanisms exist at (national and) county level with respect to managing and delivering safety nets? How does coordination differ in emergency and non-emergency situations? (CCC3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination mechanisms for safety nets are not well spelt out. • Partners convene to provide direction on addressing emergencies – but less so outside of emergencies. • Resilience interventions are implemented under normal programming. 	2.0
5.	Elaborate how accountability mechanisms across government stakeholders at different levels (national/ county/community level) are effective in ensuring that needs of affected populations are consistently met (both emergency assistance and resilience building and recovery). Describe if additional capacity strengthening measures are required to enhance both internal control mechanisms and accountability. (CCC4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reporting and accountability is done as required by the relevant internal organization systems or by external donors. • Fora or structures for public accountability are weak. • The existing M&E framework is not well understood and would require demystification. • Plans are prepared and executed at sector or departmental levels and accounted through the same sectors. No feedback is provided to the stakeholders, each department is accountable inside its reporting lines. 	
5.a	What is the coverage of programmes and the overall performance of institutions? Is the coverage based on the vulnerability definition and/or other criteria?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is no institution to coordinate the responding institutions and feedback. • There is no structure to document and disseminate lessons learnt. 	
5.b	Are there clear targets for the coverage of programmes and the performance of safety net related institutions?	<p>None state actors had their own committee to work with the county government and they provided information on stakeholder mapping. Progress and future plans concerning this committee are unclear.</p> <p>A number of important issues still need to be clarified:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who coordinates non state actors? The Department of Cohesion and Integration (Conflict response), or Administration and Coordination? • What are the bottle necks to coordinating non state actors? <p>Capacity support interventions could address the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stakeholder mapping, sharing of work plans, strengthening the department of administration and coordination to coordinate issues of safety nets, profiling of beneficiaries, common database; • Consistent and well communicated coordination meetings. • M&E framework and joint monitoring plan. • Clarification of coordination roles of different structures (CSG, Directorate of Cohesion, and Department of coordination and administration) 	
5.c	Is the performance of safety net related institutions monitored? How?		
5.d	Are there internal or external evaluations of institutional performance? If so, who carries them out and with which frequency?		
5.e	Are the results of institutional monitoring and evaluation systems readily accessible and available?		
5.f	What are their findings? Are there dissemination mechanisms to take action on recommendations coming out of these findings?		
5.g	Do internal and external findings correspond? If not, why not and in which areas? If applicable, which measures could be undertaken to improve correspondence?		
5.h	Which feedback mechanisms exist, e.g. is there a complaints and grievance mechanism that allows direct communication of communities to the lead institution(s) on SN?		
6.	Describe how the relevant institutions are able to manage risk, learn and adapt depending on changing situations and needs with a view to ensuring that safety net benefits are efficiently and consistently provided. (CCC5)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is no designated umbrella institution for safety nets. • Devolution has improved the rate of response. • However, response is delayed by bureaucracy. • Technical capacity at county level to plan, prepare, implement, monitor and report on safety nets is weak.
6.a	Are there examples where adaption to changing needs worked – or did not work?		
6.b	Do(es) the main institution(s) have an adequate risk management system that is adaptive to exogenous shocks?		
6.c	How have previous and current exogenous shocks (if applicable, such as conflicts, natural disasters, etc.) affected the institution's mission, service and effectiveness?		
6.d	What have been the key programme revisions and modifications of the main institution(s)' mission, and why/when did they occur?		

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
6.e	Are the learning/professional development needs of staff provided for? If so, how?		
6.f	Is the institution's level of technology appropriate to carry out its functions? Are there any updates to be made?		
Aggregate score for HGI 2:			2.0

HGI 3: Finance- department of finance

1.	Does government at central and county level and partners have committed funding for safety nets? (CCC1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Budget commitment exists for the elderly and disabled. The budget for the county-level programmes for elderly was KES 10 million in the previous financial year and double to KES 20 million in the present financial year. There is an enterprise development fund by the county (budget to be confirmed) There is a proposed bill on a livestock development fund. 	2.0
1.a	I.e. is there an established budget line for the function at national and sub-national/county level?		
1.b	Is there an established budget line to support food insecure communities to build resilience to droughts?		
1.c	Does the government have foreseeable budgets, enabling safety net related institutions to plan, budget and allocate internal and external resources in line with agreed priorities?		
2.	In your view, what is the level of material resources (technical knowledge, time, personnel, finances, etc.) necessary compared to the existing and foreseeable needs to ensure adequate and timely safety net coverage, including design and implementation of emergency assistance, recovery and resilience building? (CCC2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resources are not adequate to cover all intended beneficiaries. However, it is not clear to which extent intended beneficiaries of the elderly and disability funds are also covered by the relevant Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services programmes (Older Persons Cash Transfer, Persons with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer) or by the Hunger Safety Net Programme, or both. Response is not timely: about 15 percent of the beneficiaries of the elderly and disability funds have not collected their transfers due to limited access to financial services. There is no established and formalized mechanism for complaints and feedback. 	2.0
2.a	What is the share of available safety net funding as compared to present needs (present level of benefits reaching all people who would qualify for enrolment in a safety net programme)		
2.b	If the national budget does not allocate adequate funding for SN-related actions that address the SN targeted groups, are there any intentions to increase the budget in the near future? How much? Are there any indications by when such increase would take place?		
2.c	Are the funds foreseen for safety nets being disbursed to implementers in a timely manner and at the foreseen levels?		
2.d	Are there effective accountability structures and procedures that ensure the intended use of resources?		
3.	Describe the government's strategy and capacity to coordinate and engage with partners to diversify sources of funding for safety nets? How does this differ between emergency and non-emergency situations? (CCC3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is an obligation for departments to mobilize resources for their ministries. The challenge is finding willing donors. 	2.0
3.a	How were the existing safety nets funded over the past five years? (mix of contributors)		
3.b	What was the share of the population identified to be in need of safety nets that actually received such assistance?		

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
4.	Elaborate how the established procedures for resource mobilization and allocation are consistent across geographical areas and interventions, yet flexible enough to adapt to specific needs, in particular in emergency situations? (CCC4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is no elaborate resource mobilization strategy. 	2.0
4.a	What is the relation between safety net resources provided by central and by county government?		
4.b	How are county and central government contributions coordinated?		
4.c	How do processes to arrive at resource allocations at the national/county level look like?		
4.d	Is there enough flexibility to accommodate different needs/contexts (e.g. different commodity prices or implementation costs across the country/ implementing agencies)?		
5.	How adaptive is the government and partners in resource allocations to safety nets in line with changing situations and needs ? How does this in particular apply to emergency assistance, recovery and resilience building? (CCC5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Budget allocations are based on available resources, not on actual needs. The social services of the county requested KES 50 million for the elderly and disability fund, but only KES 20 million were allocated. Budgets are not flexible, and for the more permanent safety nets (elderly and disability funds) ad hoc resources provided by partners would not form a reliable basis. 	2.0
5.a	How did identified needs vary over the past five years?		
5.b	How did the level of resources provided for safety nets in each of these years adjust to the identified needs? (i.e. the share of identified needs that was actually covered)		
		Aggregate score for HGI 3:	2.0

HGI 4 – Programme Design and Management

1.	Describe the level of stakeholder involvement in the design, management and implementation of safety net programmes while ensuring compliance with national policies and standards? (CCC1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Legislated safety nets are elaborate on stakeholder involvement. The Ministry of Agriculture has entered into memorandums of understanding with non-state actors (7). Some partners are not involving the county government in the design of their programmes. 	2.0
1.a	Answering this question might require retrieval of and comparison with relevant standards for safety nets and humanitarian assistance, e.g. SPHERE.		
1.b	Are there clear national protocols on how to provide safety nets of emergency assistance, do these correspond to international standards (as far as Kenya has subscribed to them), and are they being adhered to be actual programme implementation?		
1.c	Do safety net/emergency assistance implementers comply with national guidelines, protocols, standards and procedures (e.g. targeting/beneficiary selection, modalities and rations/food baskets, quality assurance mechanisms, etc.)?		
1.d	Provide examples of stakeholder involvement in the design, management and implementation of SN programmes.		

MARSABIT COUNTY

Capacity Gaps and Needs Assessment
for Food Security Safety Nets and Emergency
Preparedness and Response

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
2.	<p>Which safety net programmes (productive/social, cash for assets or equivalent) are set in place? Provide some examples. Who implements current safety nets/emergency assistance, and how? Are there challenges that are being faced to achieve efficient and effective delivery?</p> <p>Is there a system at county level that provides management information on the interventions required in various geographic areas; and on which organizations/agencies are undertaking which programmes in specific areas?</p> <p>Are there geographic areas that have notable gaps? (CCC2)</p>	<p>County: Social protection for Elderly and disabled,</p> <p>National government: Hunger Safety Net Programme, OCV, Elderly and PWD</p> <p>Non state actors: Livestock insurance; asset creation;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is no database of the vulnerable population. • Registration/mapping of persons with disability is currently ongoing in support with the national government. The process is delayed due to the delayed disbursement of funds. • Enhanced collaboration and sharing of information with NDMA that is overseeing the Hunger Safety Net Programme would improve on this aspect. 	2.0
2.a	Does the county have an approach to identify which assistance/support is required where and when , and does it balance emergency planning with ongoing projects, and advise on areas that have gaps?		
2.b	How many people (and share of population) are assisted under existing safety nets (regular and emergency situations)?		
2.c	What is the share of people identified as being in need that is actually covered by present safety nets?		
2.d	Do current safety net programmes achieve county targets (if any)? How is this monitored? If not, how can results be improved to achieve such targets?		
2.e	Do existing government safety nets cover the most vulnerable areas of the county? How does that adapt to emergency situations?		
2.f	Are appropriate targeting methodologies in place, and are staff and partners trained to apply these (regular and emergency assistance)? If so, which? Have any internal or external evaluations of current safety nets been carried out? If so, what did they report on inclusion and exclusion errors? What is being done/could be done to improve current targeting mechanisms?		
2.g	Are systems in place for the registration of beneficiaries of safety nets?		
2.h	Are systems in place that ensure full accountability of the use of resources for safety nets/emergency assistance? How much of the programmatic inputs are reaching the intended beneficiaries? What are the main causes if foreseen resources are not reaching intended beneficiaries?		
3.	<p>If the county has a productive safety net programme, to what extent is the selection of the most appropriate interventions at community level transparent, and to what extent is the community involved in this selection, the monitoring and the evaluation of the projects? (CCC2)</p>	<p>WFP supports an asset-creation programme in Moyale with 24,500 beneficiaries, which is implemented by World Vision as the cooperating partner. There are guidelines for the selection of appropriate interventions and community involvement.</p> <p>At present, the county government is not providing the lead, but is involved in the technical county implementation team.</p>	2.0
4.	<p>Are there effective partnerships established for implementation, monitoring, evaluation and resource mobilization for permanent and emergency-related safety nets addressing the needs of affected groups? (CCC3)</p>	<p>There are no such partnerships established by the county.</p> <p>WFP works with cooperating partners, normally (international) NGOs.</p>	2.0
4.a	Which partnerships exist for the implementation of safety nets? To what extent are the civil society, the private sector and community members engaged in programme design and service delivery?		
4.b	Which of these are sustainable?		
4.c	Can they be increased?		
4.d	How much more coverage could be achieved if the sustainable partnerships would be increased?		
4.e	Is there a clear coordination mechanism in place for both more permanent and emergency assistance safety nets (e.g. different national or county-level programmes)?		

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
5.	In your view, is the design and implementation of safety net programmes coherent countywide? Define the implementation procedures and mechanisms in place (if any) to ensure consistency of service delivery and monitoring activities. Are these mechanisms flexible enough to adapt to local needs? (CCC4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The overall design and implementation of safety nets in the county is not coherent – each follows its own procedures. There is a need to develop a common framework that spells out the roles of all stakeholders. There is a need to come up with safety net implementation guidelines that formalize e.g. objectives, complementation, targeting, registration and other common features of safety nets. 	2.0
5.a	Are SN programmes adapted to rural and urban vulnerability distributions, distributions by state, age, gender, formal/informal sector and others as deemed relevant?		
5.b	Has the government planned and used different transfer modalities in the past years?		
5.c	Does the county have guidelines for using different modalities (e.g. general food distributions, asset creation, cash transfers)?		
5.d	Does the government conduct market analysis to support cash or voucher interventions?		
5.e	Are existing programmes mindful of the different roles of men and women in households and communities?		
5.f	Do the programmes ensure that women, children and the elderly have access to programmes and/or are captured in other SN programmes otherwise?		
5.g	How resources (funds and food) are allocated, prioritized and reprioritized during an ongoing response?		
6.	What specific mechanisms are in place to assess and adapt to lessons learned and changing situations? How do these differ in times of emergencies? (CCC5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are no specific mechanisms for learning and adaptation. Besides the CSG for emergency response (which is mainly to coordinate response activities), there is no forum for the sharing of information and experience. 	2.0
6.a	Is there a monitoring system to measure the effectiveness of safety nets in terms of processes (registration, targeting, data management, etc.)? If so, how are outcomes/impacts being measured and which data is being used? Do we know if existing safety net programmes enhance the ability of households to manage risks by reducing the probability of a shock and overall vulnerability?		
6.b	If results are below the target or expectations, what are the reasons? Which measures have been taken/are going to be taken to address the issue?		
6.c	Is historical data available to cross-check, learn from patterns in the past and launch projections?		
6.d	Are programmes innovative? If considered yes, specify innovative measures that have been/are being taken? Which are the increases in concrete outputs/outcomes with respect to efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability that have been achieved under specific innovative measures?		
		Aggregate score for HGI 4:	2.0
HGI 5 – Sustainability			
1.	Describe (if any) the level of government's long-term strategy for safety net programmes . Does this strategy have tangible impacts at county level? Specify major foreseeable change of responsibilities between government and non-governmental actors, and between central and sub-national levels of government? (CCC1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The county-level safety nets (elderly and disability funds) are incorporated in the CIDP; by contrast, national or partner-supported safety nets (including Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services programmes, Hunger Safety Net Programme, or WFP-supported asset creation) are not included in the CIDP. For each safety net, there is different legislation or implementation guidance. There is a need to link county and national government safety nets through a sustainability strategy. There is a need to develop common guidelines for targeting and registration of beneficiaries. 	2.0

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NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
2.	Is the projected national funding deemed stable and are resources available for safety net programmes to ensure sustainability? (CCC2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Funding is inadequate. There is no elaborate resource mobilization strategy. The county-level elderly and disability funds received only 40 percent of the requested / required budget (KES 20 of 50 million). 	
2.a	What has been the level of resources for safety nets/emergency assistance in the past five years?		
2.b	What has been the share of resource requirements that has been covered in the past five years?		
2.c	What has been the share of resources mobilized by national and county governments for these activities in the past five years?		
2.d	What are the prospects for each of these questions in the medium-term future?		
3.	Describe the long-term partnership system (if any) including stable financing of safety net programmes in the county. (CCC3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is no clear partnership strategy. 	2.0
3.a	Are the roles and responsibilities of the community and civil society clearly defined?		
3.b	Are there any strategies in place to mobilize the civil society/communities at the local level (e.g. participatory approaches, outreach activities)?		
4.	Does a flexible and strategic approach to work with communities, the civil society, and the private sector exist, to ensure their consistent participation and engagement in safety net provision? If yes, define the approach. Is the approach sustainable? (CCC4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The county government has provided a conducive working environment. However, there is no clear strategy for the engagement of communities, civil society or the private sector in safety net provision. 	2.0
4.a	Are relationships with civil society organizations adjusted based on their strengths and weaknesses for partnership and programmatic needs?		
4.b	Are authorities able to balance the interests of all stakeholders?		
5.	Elaborate how the learning process – based on monitoring processes and possibly incorporation of lessons learned – contribute to safety net programming improvement. (CCC5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is no clear strategy for documentation and the dissemination of information. 	2.0
5.a	How information and analysis of safety net programmes and their results stored and accessed? Is this information available to government, the public and the international community (where appropriate)?		
5.b	Are relevant monitoring reports disseminated to the relevant authorities?		
5.c	Are relevant monitoring reports disseminated to the general public?		
		Aggregate score for HGI 5:	2.0

ANNEX 2: MARSABIT CAPACITY GAPS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AREA 1

Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
HGI 1 - Policy and legal environment			
1.	Is the importance of early warning and food security assessment and analysis in support of food security and nutrition programming being reflected in national policies, strategies, laws etc.? (CCC1)	At the national Level, there is; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kenya Vision 2030 Sector Plan for Drought Risk Management and Ending Drought Emergencies, 2013-17 NDMA Bill 2013 that is in discussion. Legal Notice Number 171 of November 24, 2011 that established NDMA Ending Drought Emergency Common Programme Framework. National Nutrition Action Plan 2012 – 2017 Millennium Development Goals and recently the sustainable development goals Inter-governmental coordination forum 	2.7
1.a	Which are they? List relevant instruments from the constitution to national development plans, policies, strategies, etc. as applicable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ending Drought Emergency Common Programme Framework. National Nutrition Action Plan 2012 – 2017 Millennium Development Goals and recently the sustainable development goals Inter-governmental coordination forum 	
1.b	Are these instruments up-to-date, e.g. do they adequately reflect the changing environment due to devolved government?	These instruments are not all up to date as some were developed when the county governments were being formed hence the structure was not clear. They may need review or policies to operationalize them paying respect to the county structure	
2.	Has the county developed any county level policies, strategies and laws for Emergency Preparedness and Response? (CCC 1)	Yes. The county has formulated a county nutrition action plan that is in line with the national nutrition action plan. At the county there is a contingency plan in preparedness of drought emergency done in 2013, which has been reviewed once. However, when there is a need for response, more updated response plans are developed guided by the contingency plan. The current policies and strategies at the county level mostly address response and not food security assessments. However the response is based on the early warning triggers.	2.0
3.	How are these policies operationalized at county level? (CCC 2)	It is not clear how these county policies and strategies are operationalized for early warning and food security assessments and analysis, or how the same integrate with the national policies. Most of them concentrate on response mechanisms and less on assessments and hazard analysis.	1.8
4.	When devising policies and regulations in the area of early warning and food security assessment, to which extent does the county involve partners? To which extent (share of total budget) do partners contribute resources? (CCC 3)	The county fully relies on partners both state and non-state, for early warning and food security assessment. The major partner is NDMA which supports about 90% of the budget for the early warning and food security assessments. Other partners and county government support about 10% of the budget. The resources are however not adequate hence these assessments and monitoring are not conducted as desired.	2.0

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
5.	Does the (national) government have a long-term strategy or vision for the system of early warning, and food security assessments/ analysis? (CCC 5)	<p>The Kenya Vision 2030 Sector Plan for Drought Risk Management and Ending Drought Emergencies, 2013-17 provides for continued support of early warning in the 23 Arid and Semi-Arid counties. It also seeks to establish the national contingency fund to narrow the gap between early warning and response. It further seeks to develop a national integrated early warning system to ensure that early warning information is objective and relevant to provide early response</p> <p>The Legal Notice that established NDMA and the current Bill gives NDMA the mandate to establish mechanisms which ensure that drought does not become famine and that the impacts of climate change are sufficiently mitigated. These mechanisms include the modalities for early warning and food security assessments.</p> <p>The Ending Drought Emergency common programme framework highlights the need for early warning under pillar 5 of Drought Risk Management.</p> <p>The inter-governmental coordination forum brings together the governors of arid and semi-arid land counties and the national government in a joint discussion of the issues of food security in the area.</p> <p>The National Nutrition Action Plan 2012-2017 in its strategic objective 9 seeks to strengthen early warning in arid and semi-arid counties. This has changed the way nutrition issues are handled in terms of defining roles of the departments as well as the roles of the partners. It has also defined which activities are to be carried out by whom and where. The same approach has been cascaded to a county nutrition action plan.</p> <p>These action plans do not change the responsibility between the government and non-governmental actors since the roles of each are well defined. There is also clear guidelines on how to conduct disaster monitoring at the county level.</p>	3.0
5.a	Does this strategy or vision have tangible effects at county level? Does it include any major change of responsibilities between government and non-governmental actors		
5.b	If so, do they address the need for early warning system, food security assessments and analysis?		
		Aggregate score for HGI 1:	2.3

HGI 2 – Effective and Accountable Institutions

1.	Is there a designated lead institution within the county government with a clearly defined role and responsibility for the function of early warning, food security assessment and analysis? (CCC1)	<p>The lead institution with the mandate for early warning at the county is NDMA. Food security assessments are conducted by the Kenya Food Security Steering Group in collaboration with other partners at the county level. NDMA coordinates the assessments.</p> <p>The Ministry of Health, which is a devolved function under the county government, conducts surveillance specifically for health and nutrition indicators. It is also the lead department for nutrition surveys. The ministry also monitors epidemics and - in case of a disaster - shares information with partners for response.</p> <p>The NDMA has a clear mandate for drought monitoring, which looks at various sectors affected by drought. NDMA also coordinates food security assessments in collaboration with other actors at the county level including the county government.</p> <p>There's duplication in terms of data collection where different institutions have their own enumerators in the same area collecting similar data, e.g. NDMA, Concern, SIFA, and Health. This also affects the effective dissemination of results, since they all provide independent feedback to the community. This ought to be harmonized.</p> <p>The functions of these monitoring activities complement each other. Where NDMA does surveillance, the early warning triggers a rapid assessment or a nutrition survey to be conducted. The food security assessments are carried out in collaboration with all partners, who also advise on adequate response interventions.</p>	2.5
1.a	Which? Is there an existing institutional framework with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the function?		
1.b	If there are several institutions (e.g. central and county-level), how do their mandates complement, overlap, or even contradict each other?		
1.c	Are there gaps, i.e. areas within early warning, food security assessments and analysis for which no national/county level institution has a mandate?		
1.d	Do the mandates of relevant institutions ensure that all people vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition are adequately covered in early warning, and food security analysis?		

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
2.	How does this institution perform carry out early warning and food security assessments? Does it apply national tools and standards? (CCC 2)	<p>The NDMA coordinates the assessment at the county level, which is carried out by the members of Kenya Food Security Steering Group representing the national level, in collaboration with the county steering groups representing the counties. The tools used are developed and agreed upon at the national level with stakeholders and they use national and international standards during analysis and reporting.</p> <p>The early warning system does not link to the Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment. This is because the existing early warning system is for drought, which is a slow onset disaster, while the Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment is designed for rapid onset disasters.</p> <p>The county does not have any other tools for use in assessments. During the bi-annual food security assessments, they rely on the tools from Kenya Food Security Steering Group, who also leads the process. Nutrition surveys have standardized tools used, i.e. the Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition (SMART). Rapid assessments done by the counties have no tools or defined methodology.</p> <p>There is a gap in terms of tools and methodology for use during the rapid assessments when they are required by the county.</p>	2.8
2.a	How are early warning system, Long/Short rains assessments and the Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment linked together?		
2.b	Does the county have other food security assessment tools? (Please list them e.g. harvest assessments, livestock...)		
3.	Is there a coordination mechanism in place to facilitate the enhancement of information sharing, forecasting and scenario building? (CCC 3)	<p>Yes. During emergencies the CSG is used as the platform that coordinates all partners involved in emergency response. The methodology available for food security assessments is provided by the Kenya Food Security Steering Group from the national level. At the county level there has been no methodology used to come up with assessments. During emergencies, rapid assessments are conducted though there is no set methodology or tools for this. Nutrition surveys follow a defined methodology (SMART), which has been globally used.</p>	2.0
3.a	In an emergency situation is there a coordination mechanism that facilitates the planning of assessments? Is an appropriate methodology in place for carrying out food security assessment, including for nutrition, in emergency settings?		
4.	How is the information and analysis stored and accessed, and is it available to government, the public (CCC4)	<p>For early warning information, there is a database (with software for analysis), which is being updated. There is no such database for food security assessment: Here, data is not stored after assessment, and data is not available to public but only to government and partners on request.</p> <p>Yes. The results of early warning and assessment are distributed to all partners and government authorities including county government. However, the understanding of decision-makers of the indicators and processes is limited.</p> <p>The early warning and assessment results are distributed and posted online: they are thus available for public use in principle, but the share of the general public in the county that can access them is very limited. Due to insufficient funding, there are no meetings held to feed early warning information back to the people. There have been attempts with support from partners to have a radio talk show for this and also use flags for early warning, however, coverage is still low.</p>	1.7
4.a	Are the results of early warning, and food security assessments and analysis disseminated to the relevant authorities?		
4.b	Are the results of early warning, and food security assessments and analysis disseminated to the general public and to the communities where data is collected?		
Aggregate score for HGI 2:			2.3
HGI 3: Finance			
1.	Who is currently financing the early warning system? How long will this continue? (CCC 1)	<p>The financing of early warning and food security assessment relies on the budget line from the national government. However, when there is a need for a rapid assessment, the county government and actors support it financially. There is no specific budget line for early warning and assessment within the county government budgetary provisions.</p> <p>Neither the county nor its partners have a dedicated budget line for early warning and food security assessments.</p>	2.2
1.a	Do you at the county level have access to, and have committed funding for early warning and food security assessment and analysis, i.e. is there an established budget line for the function at the county?		
2.	Do you have sufficient material resources (financial, institutional) to ensure regular and undisrupted early warning and food security analysis i.e. is the available budget sufficient for the required action? (CCC2)	<p>The available funds are not enough to conduct the required exercises. The SMART survey was not conducted since the county government had no funds dedicated for the exercise in the financial year. Some activities of early warning are also not done due to limited funding from the national government, including data quality assessments and community feedback meetings.</p> <p>When the budget line from the national government is not adequate, county government and partners come in for support. However, they don't have a dedicated budget line for this.</p>	1.5
2.a	Do you, and partners, have the capacity to efficiently manage financial resources in order to ensure adequate, timely and accountable funding for early warning and food security analysis?		

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NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
3.	Do you have the capacity to coordinate and engage with partners to diversify sources of funding for early warning, and food security analysis, if relevant? (CCC3)	<p>The county has the capacity to engage with partners to support early warning and food security assessment, but partners' funding capacity depends on their financial position.</p> <p>During assessments, partners come in to support where funds are not enough. The partners who have come in to support these activities include ADESO who have supported drought ambassador clubs in schools and flag messages for early warning. Concern Worldwide and VSF Germany have supported the dissemination of early warning system results. Some of the support has been paying for airtime in vernacular radio for a talk show to disseminate early warning information.</p>	2.0
Aggregate score for HGI 3:			1.9

HGI 4 – Programme Design and Management

1.	Does the county government have, or does it have any plans to establish, own capacity with respect to early warning and food security assessment to support and complement NDMA/ Kenya Food Security Steering Group? (CCC 1)	<p>The existing arrangements for food security assessments involve technical capacity in the county from various sector heads, hence there is already an existing county capacity. However this capacity is not adequate and there is a need to increase it considering the considerable turnover of staff in connection with devolution. However, there are no set plans by the county on how this can be done, though the gap is there. The early warning is run mostly by NDMA and there are no plans by the county as well towards this initiative. There are other non-state actors however who have come in to support the existing gaps, though minimally.</p> <p>Besides staff capacity, the existing gaps within the early warning are mostly financial. The county has seen this especially in the coverage of the NDMA sentinel sites, which are not felt to be adequate. There are however no plans towards filling this gaps.</p>	1.5
1.a	Does the county see any gaps that NDMA/ Kenya Food Security Steering Group does not address, and which it would like to fill?		
2.	Is there sufficient staff, and does relevant staff have sufficient knowledge and skills to ensure regular and uninterrupted early warning and Food security analysis in support of food security/nutrition? (CCC2).	<p>Yes. There are sufficient staff to conduct early warning assessment as well as food security assessment.</p> <p>However the capacity of the staff need to be strengthened especially with the devolution that has brought in new people, while others, who had been trained, have moved out or were re-deployed.</p>	2.0
3.	Is the early warning system adequately linked to food security assessments, and response analyses, and the triggering of response action within the prevailing institutional architecture to address identified levels of vulnerability? (CCC 3)	<p>Yes. The early warning is linked to food security assessment. Early warning triggers rapid assessment and also inputs to the main assessment. The nutritional surveys are also synchronized with food security assessments as the survey data inform the food security assessments.</p> <p>Yes, if food insecurity is determined, this triggers funds and actions, though the availability of funds is limited and not all activities are conducted as desired.</p>	2.3
3.a	For example, if the analysis points to food insecurity, does this trigger an assistance process? What are the triggers and which funds/actions do they trigger?		
Aggregate score for HGI 4:			1.9

HGI 5 – Sustainability

1.	Does the government at county level and its partners have the capacity to design and implement emergency preparedness and response interventions informed by an appropriate early warning, and food security analysis? (CCC2)	<p>Yes. There is capacity at the county for designing and implementing emergency preparedness and response based on findings or assessments, surveys and early warning. When early warning indicates a need for response, sectors come together in the CSG and come up with a joint response plan, informed by the contingency plan. Response activities and resources mobilization are then based on the joint response plan.</p>	2.8
2.	Are there systems and resources available for civil society, communities, and private sector's participation in the development and management of policy and programmes addressing needs of target groups, and for monitoring and feedback at the county levels? Are these systems and resources sustainable? (CCC2)	<p>Yes. The CSG and Sub-county CSG are available structures where these actors participate in issues of policy and programmes when response targeting is being planned. These structures are sustainable and they are anchored to government institutions, which have been established permanently. However the involvement of communities is low.</p> <p>The county government chairs the CSG, and NDMA acts as its secretariat. These permanent government institutions are well-placed to provide continuity at a time of widespread institutional change.</p>	2.1

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
3.	Are mobilized resources and partnerships sustainable to plan, design and implement necessary activities? (CCC3)	The mobilized resources are not sustainable since some of them depend on partners who have a defined timeframe of operation. The resources are further dependent on donor support. There is therefore need to increase commitment from both county and national governments to ensure sustainability.	1.8
4.	Are the civil society, communities and the private sector at the county levels committed to addressing the needs of affected groups? Are these commitments tailored in a sustainable way? (CCC 3)	Civil society organizations are committed to support the affected population. The challenge is that some of them do not cover the entire county hence their response is limited to where their programmes are implemented. The commitments of the institutions are also not sustainable since they are dependent on their donor funding and they are not obliged by any law or regulation to provide these services. Long-term agreements to ensure this support are not in place either. There is a need for joint planning to ensure that programme design is informed by existing data so all the vulnerable are covered.	2.1
5.	Are civil society, communities and private sector actively contributing resources and are they engaged in designing and implementing activities addressing the needs of vulnerable groups? (CCC3)	No. Some of the programmes of civil society organizations are not flexible enough to address the existing needs. However, other civil society organizations are contributing resources and are engaged in planning and implementation. Despite this there are always resource gaps since the areas of coverage for these institutions unlike government institutions vary. Their sustainability is also dependent on their donor funding.	2.0
6.	Do established procedures for resource mobilization and funding allocation ensure consistency across geographical areas and interventions, yet are flexible enough to adapt to specific needs? (CCC4)	The procedures involving the county and national government are consistent across the county and are flexible enough to adopt to related needs. However, the coverage of other supporting partners is limited to some areas of operation according to their programme design.	2.5
7.	Do the civil society, communities and the private sector contribute to the county's learning and to incorporating lessons learned and good practices to sustain adequate emergency preparedness and response activities for vulnerable groups? (CCC5)	Mainly with respect to response there are lessons learnt that have been used by partners to inform the design and approach of intervention activities. There is not much evidence of changes made in light of a changing environment. The level of sharing is low.	1.8
		Aggregate score for HGI 5:	2.2

ANNEX 3: MARSABIT CAPACITY GAPS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AREA 2

Humanitarian Supply Chain Management

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
HGI 1 - Policy and legal environment			
1.	Is the importance of humanitarian supply chain management reflected in national policies, strategies, laws etc.? [CCC1]	Yes. The Fourth schedule of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) identifies, <i>inter alia</i> , disaster management and risk reduction as concurrent functions for both levels of government. However, there is no clear threshold at which the national government steps in to the disaster response activities.	
1.a	Which are they? – list relevant instruments from constitution to national development plans, policies, strategies, etc. as applicable	<p>National Level:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitution of Kenya (2010) Bill of rights • Nutritional action plan <p>County Level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency fund KES 40m in the county for response • Contingency plan developed for drought response in 2013. Was reviewed in 2014(to be confirmed) • There is an county emergency fund act • (gap- no acts of county assembly to enact bill for disaster response) • Nutritional action plan • Departmental strategic plans and sectoral plans • emergency preparedness and response plan at departmental level being developed 	2.0
1.b	Are these instruments up to date, e.g. do they adequately reflect the changing environment due to devolved government?	The CIDP is currently undergoing a review at the end of which it is expected to be updated. The Contingency plan on the other hand, developed for drought response is due for update.	
2.	Are there contingency plans in place at national and sub-national level to ensure adequate and timely response [CCC1]	The drought and El Niño contingency plans are active through established committees but the latter is temporal due to lack of an established institution to deal with emergency preparedness and response	
2.a	If there is a contingency plan, [CCC1] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is it based on adequate legislation / regulations? • Does it establish clear mandates, roles and responsibilities of actors at county level? Of which institutions or actors? • Does it include a result framework and timelines? • Does it include SOPs? • Are there identified gaps in implementation? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Contingency plans are not necessarily based on legislation/ regulations- plans are more ad- hoc and needs based. • The county constitutes with committees when need arises to address arising needs • There is no clear plan for resource mobilization and funding for response other than the allocation for Emergency Fund established by the Emergency Fund Act of 2014. • The roles, mandates and responsibilities of various actors are not clear to all actors. No set thresholds are in place for escalations of the emergency responses to the national government, and no cooperation agreements exist with neighbouring county governments for joint emergency response coordination where required. • Concurrent functions are linked to different departments; • When the county is overwhelmed, assistance is sought from outside 	2.0
3.	Do national policies and strategies include all types of emergencies beyond drought for effective emergency response? Are there guidelines in place to guide the process? [CCC 1]	Apart from the drought and El Niño contingency plans there are no other plans in place on response to disasters but are crafted whenever the need to do so arises.	2.0
4.	Are the identified instruments implemented as foreseen? Describe if they are translated into action plans with clear responsibilities, and if there are gaps in implementation-which? [CCC 2] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disaster Management Bill • County disaster plan; • County policy and county strategic plan? • CIDP • County Contingency Plan (if any) 	Plans for sectoral response are key documents for the service delivery by line ministries, which is thus implemented as foreseen. The instruments guide the annual work plans. Inadequate resources affect implementation of developed plans, which are neither funded by the national government nor supported by development partners. There is need to engage the development partners more strategically so that whenever possible, their activities contribute directly to the identified priorities for a given year. Besides insufficient funding, other gaps include the lack of technical expertise.	3.0

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
5.	When devising instruments related to humanitarian supply chain management, has government established partnerships with relevant key stakeholders (United Nations, civil society, private sector, research institutes, other governments, etc.), specifically with those players that have a direct role in supporting or contributing to humanitarian supply chain management? (CCC3)	<p>The county government has a consultative and participatory process for the development of the instruments relevant to emergency preparedness and response. The CIDP and the Contingency plan formulation processes appear to have been widely consultative. The extent of community participation is limited by low literacy levels of the population. The stakeholders include local and international NGOs, United Nations agencies, line ministries, and other non-state actors who are represented in technical forums.</p> <p>At sub-county levels, communities are involved, too.</p> <p>The distribution of roles is clear to all stake holders</p>	3.5
6.	Do county development plans, and other instruments supporting emergency preparedness and response establish links to other relevant instruments and programmes to ensure increased stability and reliability? Do they foresee the involvement of communities in humanitarian supply chain management? (CCC4)	<p>Guidance is obtained from Vision 2030 and the Kenya constitution when developing plans which respond to and complement these. The spatial plan of the county helps to cascade global and national policies to the county.</p> <p>For disaster risk reduction, information on drought is provided by NDMA.</p> <p>Lack of resources however make it difficult to implement the policies</p> <p>No clear mechanisms for alarm systems during emergencies</p>	2.0
7.	Are the relevant instruments supporting emergency response flexible enough to respond to changing situations and needs? (<i>new organizational structures, sub-county needs</i>) (CCC5).	<p>Implementation of plans within the confines of the Emergency Fund Act are flexible to changing situations and unique needs. Beyond that, the systems and laws in place do not give so much room for flexibility. The supplementary budgeting process is not flexible, at the very least in an emergency response scenario.</p> <p>There is need for more consultations and exhaustive consideration when developing plans. This includes involvement of communities but such is limited due to low literacy levels hindering full participation in decision making by the affected community members</p>	2.0
Aggregate score for HGI 1:			2.5

HGI 2 – Institutions

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
1.	Is there a designated lead institution within the county coordinating emergency response? (CCC1)	There is no law establishing a designate lead institution to lead emergency response activities in the county. The Directorate of Cohesion and Integration has, however, previously led the emergency preparedness and response activities especially when crises were conflict and insecurity related. NDMA coordinates sector contingency plans for drought related emergencies, while other departments such as health constitute emergency response committees in consultation with the CSG to respond to other types of emergencies.	1.0
1.a	Which institution? If there are several institutions (e.g. central and county-level), how do their mandates complement, overlap, or contradict each other?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Department of Cohesion (mainly because of the recurrent tribal conflicts) • NDMA on drought monitoring and advising the stakeholders • Nutrition department also monitors nutritional issues • County Emergency Funding only for response level 	
1.b	Do the mandates of relevant institutions ensure that emergency response can adequately reach all people vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition? Are there gaps between institutional mandates? Which?	<p>The CSG is mandated to coordinate all stakeholders in a way that ensures that all vulnerable people are reached in an emergency response. It is, however, unclear how this is enforced, as there is no legal framework for the coordination. It would appear that emergency response services are based mostly on mutual trust to reach all affected population.</p> <p>A stronger coordination or regulation of the areas covered by NGOs could contribute to this objective</p>	
1.c	Are the roles and responsibilities of the lead institution clearly defined?	Without a designate lead institution, clarity of roles is a challenge, as extensive consultations have to go into the roles of various actors within the committees identified for emergency response.	
2.	Are the roles/responsibilities of the different stakeholders and administrative levels (sub-national and national) clearly defined for the function? (CCC2)	The roles of different stakeholders for emergency preparedness and response are defined as part of sectors in contingency plans. The El Niño contingency plan for example consolidates the various sector contingency plans defining each sector's roles. The process of developing the Drought Contingency plan, though led by NDMA, was widely consultative, which contributes to the clear understanding of each actor's role.	3.0

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE	
3.	Do relevant institutions involved in emergency response have the systems, processes and resources (e.g. in terms of staff, knowledge, guidelines/procedures and equipment) to work in an efficient and accountable manner? Provide answers below (CCC2)	The institutions currently engaged in emergency preparedness and response activities are developing systems, processes, knowledge and technical capacity to effectively respond to emergencies.	2.0	
3.a	Systems and processes	Procurement		The e-procurement is in place, offering both regular procurement procedures and direct procurement options which are essential for emergency response. This is in compliance with the Public Procurement Act.
		Funds Management		This is regulated by the Public Financial Management Act. The Government is at various stages of rolling out the Integrated Financial Management and Information System (IFMIS)
		Commodity tracking		Only manual delivery notes are issued for the movement of relief commodities. It is not clear how they are tracked and receipts confirmed. A technological platform to support the commodity movements and accounting is not in place.
		Quality assurance / accountability and control		No quality assurance is done for commodities used for relief activities in the county. Once tenders are awarded, the system gives a benefit of doubt to the suppliers to deliver goods of acceptable quality to the beneficiaries. This was identified as a risky engagement and some consultations need to be initiated with the Public Health Department to establish points of quality assurance within the supply chain, possibly at the procurement and the final distribution points.
3.b	Human resources	Planning and Operation Management		None. The office of the Governor takes the lead when need arises and involves all the stakeholders
		Commodity and Warehouse Management		Commodity purchases involve tendering for the purchase and transportation to final distribution points. No warehousing has been done in the past. There is an identified need to develop systems and structures for warehousing at ward and sub-county levels to ensure that pre-positioning can be done for emergency response commodities.
		Transportation coordination		The county has contracts in place, and commercial transporters are engaged for transportation of commodities. Emergency response transport coordination structures need to be reviewed for effective and efficient dispatch operations.
		Fund management		Financial management is done at three levels for emergency response: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The county executive member in charge of Finance is responsible for the overall management of the emergency fund, as provided for by the Emergency Fund Act 2014. • NGOs, United Nations agencies and other humanitarian actors manage their emergency response budgets in line with the donor requirements and internal regulations. • Committees established for emergency response have at any given time have a focal person for the management of any finances, who would ideally be someone from the Finance and Treasury department.
3.c	SOPs	Procurement		There are no specific SOPs for procurement in emergency response. However, there is a system in place provided for by the PPA, which has not been refined by the preparation of SOPs.
		Funds Management		No SOPs for Funds Management. Guidance is set out in the Emergency Fund Act.
		Commodity tracking		No SOPs for this area.
		Quality assurance / accountability and control	No SOPs for Quality Assurance in government relief operations. Delivery notes used to ensure deliver of commodities to the recipients.	
3.d	Information management	Data collection Data compilation, consolidation and quality assurance Analysis Reporting and sharing of information Learning and feed-back	The county does not have an integrated information management system. There is a principal communication officer, who covers county events for sharing with the media. Use of local FM stations to determinate information and getting immediate feedback from the public. Use of social media, e.g. Facebook There is a need for a data management and analysis system. No learning and feed back	

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
4.	How does the day-to-day work of emergency response function? Are there any bottlenecks? What could be the underlying reasons for these? (CCC2)	Depending on the type of emergency a committee of the affected sectors in consultation with the CSG would be developed. E.g. if a disaster occurs affecting livestock, then all stakeholders in line with livestock matters come together, form a committee to address the situation. Funding remains the major bottleneck...	2.0
5.	Is there an effective coordination mechanism that includes all county sectors and stakeholders during emergency response? (CCC3)	The County Steering Group (CSG) whose structure is borrowed heavily from the former District Steering Groups (DSGs) exercises the coordination function during emergency response. This is done through its various committees and also its sub-county steering groups (SCSG)	3.0
6.	Does the coordination mechanism effectively enforce accountability among stakeholders at the county level? Does it ensure that humanitarian supplies actually reach the people that should be covered by emergency assistance? (CCC4)	CSG coordinates responses in the county. It is attended by all stakeholders in the county. Decisions of the CSG are binding. However, the structure of the CSG is not clearly defined and its roles, mandates and operating framework is not set out in any known law or policy document. The county is working on stakeholder analysis to know who is doing what and where to avoid duplication and enhance efficiency of humanitarian assistance in reaching vulnerable populations.	3.0
7.	Which risks management strategies do the relevant institutions have? (CCC5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involve elders in cohesion and administration to engage in peace promotion • Involve community health volunteers in awareness creation units. • Ensure disease surveillance and smart surveys(nutrition) - monitor diseases • Use of various committees depending on need. • NDMA drought monitoring and surveillance • Development and relief committees • Hunger Safety Net Programme – community committees ensure that targeted people get their benefits 	2.7
Aggregate score for HGI 2:			2.4

HGI 3: Finance			
1.	Does government at central and county level and national partners have committed funding for emergency response? (CCC1)	The county has committed funding for emergency response established by the Marsabit Emergency Fund Act 2014. KES 40 million initial budget is allocated for emergency response.	
1.a	Is there an established budget line for the function at national and sub-national level? How much is allocated? Is the available budget sufficient for the required action?	The amount is insufficient given that for example the budget for El Niño alone is KES 700 million, which only for this disaster leaves a funding gap of KES 660 million. The county can borrow up to KES 380 million from other departments. No budgetary allocation is in place for mitigation and preparedness activities.	1.5
1.b	Is there a contingency fund for emergency response? Is it adequate?	The county has no Contingency fund for emergency response. There is an identified need to create this fund.	
2.	In an emergency, can financial resources and assets be accessed rapidly to purchase and mobilize food assistance? (CCC2) Or does the government have a contingency stock? If yes, provide a list of contingency stock!	Yes. Though the fund is inadequate, the fund allocated for response can be accessed quickly as one does not need to go through the normal procedures. There are no contingency stocks of food and non-food items (NFI) in place.	2.0
3.	Does the government and its national partners have the capacity to efficiently manage financial resources in order to ensure adequate, timely and accountable emergency response? (CCC2)	Management systems are in place and the county has the capacity to manage financial resources in an emergency response. The treasury department is well established, and the establishment of a special entity charged with the responsibility for emergency response is expected and foreseen to further streamline resource management in emergency response. Challenges beyond the county's control include e.g. accountability at community level and timely disbursement from the national government.	3.0

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4.	How has the government coordinated and engaged with partners to diversify sources of funding for emergency response in the past 5 years? (mention the mix of contributors) (CCC3)	The coordination is done well through the CSG and other forums. Where need arises, the county through the County Governor sent funding appeals to the partners.	3.2
5.	Does the county have an established procedure for resource mobilization? (CCC4)	The existing strategy is not adequately structured in terms of roles and responsibilities of particular institutions and individuals within the government in resource mobilization. However, there exists a link with other stakeholders and investors through national and international relationships, which are created through development plans.	2.0
6.	Are government and national partners able to adapt resources to changing situations and needs? (CCC5)	Yes, adjustment can be done through rationalization and prioritization. Outsourcing too from other partners is done to replenish what is at hand.	
6.a	How did identified needs vary over the past five years?	Drought is the main disaster, perennially striking the county. In terms of intensity and frequency, drought incidences have increased in recent years. In the last two years, tribal conflict affected the county as well. Other conflicts arise from competition for natural resources, in particular e.g. pasture and water.	
6.b	How did the level of resources provided for emergency assistance in each of these years adjust to the identified needs? (i.e. the share of identified needs that was actually covered).	The interventions of national government and other humanitarian organizations played a significant role in responding to the disasters especially the tribal conflict in Moyale.	
Aggregate score for HGI 3:			2.4

HGI 4 – Programme Design and Management

1.	Are there clear national protocols on how to provide humanitarian supplies, including public procurement and accountability standards, and are they being adhered to? (CCC1)	There are no specific guidelines for providing humanitarian supplies in the county. For procurement, the Public Procurement Act is in force, and adherence is not optional. Whereas direct procurement is an option, it is not accompanied by adequate SOPs and guidelines at the county level to ensure effectiveness in an emergency response scenario.	2.0
1.a	Are there rapid procurement processes in place for food, special nutrition products and NFI, whilst ensuring accountability?	Direct procurement can be done via e-procurement allowing accountability. Nutrition products are mainly provided by donors and are readily prepositioned to the health facilities by the development partners and pass through systems that ensure accountability.	
2.	Does the government and its national partners have the capacity for adequate emergency response that ensures that planned emergency assistance actually reaches the targeted beneficiaries? (CCC2)	Yes, but with limitations as described in (a) to (f) below:	
2.a	Is there sufficient storage capacity of good standard?	The county government has limited storage facilities at its disposal. Whereas the National Cereals and Produce Board has a warehouse in Marsabit, there is no agreement in place between the two entities in terms of storage provision. There is a need for storage facilities at sub-county and ward level.	
2.b	Does the Government have sufficient contingency of means of transport or are rapid activation agreements in place for contracted transportation services in time of rapidly increasing needs?	The county government does not have trucks but has prequalified contracted transporters in place. The transporters can be rapidly mobilized for emergency response.	
2.c	In case of complete failure of road transport, is there alternative transport in place to reach affected areas (e.g. waterways, air)?	Animal transport, and - along the lake - small boats can be used. The contracted transporters do not have off-road trucks. As the county is affected by floods whenever heavy rains are received, it is essential that the county considers rapid activation contracts for emergency response.	1.8
2.d	Does the existing overland transport infrastructure enable reliable access to crises prone areas at any time?	Access to crisis prone areas remains a major challenge. The road networks are poor. Apart from the main Isiolo - Moyale highway, the rest of the roads are mostly inaccessible during the rains. The government carries out road assessments along its budgetary cycle when planning for repairs, and from time to time when need arises. This is neither regular nor consistent, hence unreliable for emergency preparedness and response. It is necessary to discuss the possibility of scheduling the assessments on a regular basis to ensure smooth passage of humanitarian assistance any time in the event of an emergency.	
2.e	Can the contracted transport vehicles access difficult terrains?	No, they are not equipped for tough terrains... there are no contracts in place for specialized trucks (4x4 and 6x6 trucks)	

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
2.f	Does government have a list of NGOs, community-based organizations and other partners to be engaged during emergency response? – Still to be answered.	The government has a list of NGOs and community-based organizations engaged in various emergency preparedness and response-related activities. The activities of the partners are contained in MoUs signed between NGOs and the line ministry in charge of the sector, which the NGO addresses.	
2.g	How is the humanitarian assistance tracked and recorded? Is this information shared with other stakeholders including the communities?	Delivery notes are used to deliver food to FDPs but no database is set up or record keeping mechanisms in place for reference and tracking.	
3.	Are there clear Standard Operating Procedures in place that ensure adequate, timely and accountable emergency response? (CCC2)	The present SOPs for emergency response are inadequate. There is an identified need to develop SOPs.	1.0
4.	Are effective partnerships for emergency response established (CCC3)	There are effective partnerships in place through the CSG and departmental committees which have a good attendance from relevant stakeholders.	2.5
4.a	Which partners are involved, and how?	Concern, Aphy Plus, Unicef, VSF, WFP, WHO, World Vision, Food Security: NDMA, KRCS, WFP, WWI Education: KNEF, CARITAS, GOAL, PACIDA, UNICEF, WFP Water and sanitation: Almost all	
5.	Are design and implementation of emergency response coherent countywide and are procedures in place to ensure consistency of service delivery and monitoring, yet flexible enough to adapt to local needs? (CCC4)	Implementation procedures for emergency response are coherent. Bi-annual food security assessments are conducted nationwide, and its reports guide appropriate interventions by state and non-state actors. Rapid assessments using the Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment and other tools are also conducted jointly with partners at the county level whenever needs arise within the county.	2
5.a	Are technological applications in place for planning and managing humanitarian assistance?	Technological support is not in place to support emergency response.	
5.b	Does the present system for emergency preparedness and response use a standard methodology, or does the system foresee various models according to geographic areas, market conditions and other circumstances?	No specific methodology is used. In-kind donations have been in place for some time, but cash transfer mechanisms are picking up, too. Programme design should be more flexible to facilitate different intervention modalities.	
6.	Do emergency response procedures and structures have mechanisms in place to analyse and adapt to lessons learned and changing situations and are these used effectively? Do they foresee assessments of e.g. market conditions as a precondition to apply different modalities of emergency assistance, including cash? (CCC5)	Structures are not there, but plans are in place to pilot cash transfer programmes. There is a need to strengthen learning mechanisms	2
Aggregate score for HGI 4:			2.0

HGI 5 – Sustainability			
1.	Does the government have a long-term strategy or vision for sustaining and ensuring humanitarian supply chain management in the future? Does this vision include any major change of responsibilities between government and non-governmental actors, and between central and sub-national levels of government? (CCC1)	There is presently no long term strategy. The county has mainly focused on catching up with other counties after years of marginalization. Technical level county officials would need strengthened capacity to bring up the issue so that sustainability is included in the strategic plan of the county. Stakeholders should be taken through the important pillars of disaster risk reduction to promote the emergency preparedness and response and disaster risk reduction agenda.	1.5
2.	Is national funding stable and are resources available for adequate humanitarian supply chain management? (CCC2)	Funding is stable but inadequate.	
2.a	What has been the level of resources for humanitarian supply chain management in the past five years?	Disaster Contingency Fund 2014/15 KES 39 Million Disaster Contingency Fund 2015/16 KES 16 Million	
2.b	What has been the share of resource requirements that has been covered in the past five years?		
2.c	What has been the share of resources mobilized by national and county governments for these activities in the past five years?		
2.d	What are the prospects for each of these questions in the medium-term future?		

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NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
3.	Are there systems and resources available for civil society, communities, and private sector's participation in emergency response, and for monitoring and feedback at the national and county levels? Are these systems and resources sustainable? (CCC2)	<p>There are the CSG at county level, sub-CSG at sub count level and other forums at community level e.g. relief committees.</p> <p>The systems are sustainable due to active involvement of the stakeholders (civil societies, partners, communities, etc.)</p> <p>Monitoring is rather weak and there is need to strengthen it. The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit is being established to be in place to be monitoring all county emergency preparedness and response related activities.</p>	2.5
4.	Does government lead the present system of emergency response? How? Does the present system rest on a secure (multiple-sourced) basis of resources, and are back-up plans in place? (CCC3)	<p>The county government takes the lead in ER and coordinates all activities.</p> <p>Much of the resources are provided by donors and development partners engaged in humanitarian activities within the county.</p> <p>Back-up plans include appeals to the national level and to development partners. Furthermore, the county can decide supplementary budgets to reassign funds from development budget lines to emergency budget lines.</p>	2.5
5.	Are civil society, communities and the private sector actively contributing resources and are they engaged in emergency response? Are mobilized resources and partnerships sustainable to plan, design and implement necessary activities? (CCC3)	Yes, contribution of resources and participation is there but not sustainable.	2.5
5.a	Is the engagement of these partners flexible, strategic and sustainable?	Sector forums are present that meet and share departmental issues. These forums form the CSG	
6.	How is information and analysis for emergency response and its results stored and accessed? Is this information available to government, the public and the international community (where appropriate)? (CCC4)	The information can be obtained in various reports done by the secretariat at the national government with the assistance of county officials. However, information is not available in a structured way.	2.0
6.a	Are relevant monitoring reports disseminated to the relevant authorities?	The reports are disseminated to the relevant organs, in this case the CSG.	
6.b	Are relevant monitoring reports disseminated to the general public?	Available on request	
7.	Is emergency response performance monitored? Are challenges/potential failures of the emergency response system identified, are they discussed and are lessons learned to improve the system? Can you provide examples? (CCC5)	No monitoring is done currently. Discussions are ongoing within the county government to establish a Monitoring and Evaluation Unit for the county government programs and emergency response activities.	1.5
7.a	Do all stakeholders (civil society, communities, partners and the private sector) contribute to learning and to incorporating lessons learned and good practices to sustain emergency response?	The mechanisms for learning and good practices to be incorporated into future emergency response activities are not adequately structured. There is need to strengthen the learning and knowledge management mechanism, which will enable good practices to be embedded in the programme designs at the county.	
Aggregate score for HGI 5:			2.0

